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Abstract 
A host of scholars have made great contributions to establishing a theory regarding 
potential causes on alliance credibility in areas including a quantitative and qualitative 
approach. Previous empirical findings support that taking account of only one ally in alliance 
power increase or decrease, which is a monadic power shift, regardless of the other ally’s 
power shift is likely to affect alliance credibility; thus the power shift considering only one 
ally may be a significant contributor for decline of alliance credibility. Morrow and Leeds 
argue monadic power shifts might trigger a decline of alliance credibility providing a 
reasoning that one ally’s power increase tends to demand its more autonomy to lead to 
conflicts of interests causing a decline of alliance credibility, or one ally’s power increase is 
likely to make it feel less dependent upon alliance that might lead to weak alliance 
commitments, thus causing a decline of alliance credibility. However, I argue that depending 
upon the monadic power shift theory might overlook important dyadic effects. Since actors 
of alliance tend to interact with one another through cooperation or distrust behavior, taking 
account of power shift in allied-dyads that reflects a power ratio compared with past dyadic 
power shifts may be more plausible than monadic effects. In other words, a power shift of 
countries does not always invoke a less alliance credibility because dyadic power shifts in 
alliance might lead to no change of credible alliance while monadic power shifts tend to 
decrease alliance credibility. Therefore, I examine the relationship between a dyadic power 
shift and alliance credibility. I argue that dyadic power shifts, strictly distinct from monadic 
power shifts, have a significant effect on alliance credibility. Furthermore, I regarded gap of 
threat perception as a reasonable proxy for alliance credibility, and the gap of threat 
perception will be measured by affinity of nations based on the results of the UN roll-call 
votes because I provide a different approach to replace the existing measurement, fulfillment 
of alliance commitments, for the same dependent variable. I also refer to national material 
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capabilities index to measure the dyadic power shifts. The empirical evidence is 
incommensurate with the hypothesis. The results contradict the hypothesis that when dyadic 
power shifts in alliance occur, alliance credibility is likely to decrease. The results suggest 
that dyadic power shifts in alliance tends to facilitate increase of alliance credibility while 
additionally dyadic power shifts in non-allied or all dyads seem to trigger less affinity of 
nations regardless of my hypothesis that observations are limited to allied dyads.
  
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
My desire to study the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. stems from its 
deep relevance to what I do in the military. Even though there should be abundant subfields 
that I am able to take an interest in, as a military man I determined to concentrate on alliance 
credibility out of topics within the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. In the first 
place the ROK-US military alliance has played a role in enabling South Korea to enhance its 
own security power and me to study in the U.S. Secondly, I would like to make a 
contribution by examining an important political issue in terms of military alliance between 
the two countries, since I am expected to study in the field of a political science. George 
Liska, in the beginning sentences of his Nations in Alliance, which remains one of the major 
theoretical directions, puts it: “It is impossible to speak of international relations without 
referring to alliances. For the same reason, it has always been difficult to say much that is 
peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis.”1 It is undeniable that alliances and 
alignments are one of the most widespread means to enhance own country’s security. 
According to neorealist theory,2 in an anarchic world, there is no central or higher authority 
to ensure complete security. Countries make various efforts to fill this security void. Even 
though it might be straightforward to enhance security by strengthening, it would not be easy 
for any nations to spend its entire budget on a military buildup. Thus, most countries tend to 
use not only military buildup but also alliances as a reasonable vehicle to achieve its security 
                                                 
 
 
1
 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1962), p. 3. For a comprehensive inventory and discussion of theoretical propositions in a more 
“behavioral” vein, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973). 
2
 See Walz, The Theory of International Politics, chaps. 6 and 8, for the neorealist position on alliances under 
both bipolarity and multipolarity 
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goal. As Michael Altfeld observes, the tradeoff between arms and allies with a simple 
microeconomic model3, states should pursue the alternative that ensures a significant 
increment of security at as cheap a cost as possible compared with the other. In sum, they 
seek out the optimum tradeoff that ensures increased security. 
The dominant view in contemporary study regards alliances as vehicles for 
aggregating capabilities based on the balance of power or threat theory (Morgenthau 1973; 
Waltz 1979; Walt 1987). These theories center on the idea that allies gain security from the 
alliance. However, Morrow (1991) claims that alliances can be explained by the autonomy-
security trade-off model, which additionally incorporates symmetric and asymmetric 
alliances. According to this model, symmetric alliances tend to provide both sides with the 
same benefits, including either autonomy or security, while in asymmetric alliances one side 
receives security benefits and the other side gains autonomy benefits. This feature of alliance 
may play a crucial role in determining how much countries trust their alliance partners 
because symmetric alliances tend to pursue solely autonomy as the same interest, yielding 
conflicts of interest. 
Inarguably, the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. has been one of the most 
markedly asymmetric relationships as measured by Morrow’s perception of asymmetry, 
although the conventional belief from South Korean perspective indicates the relationship to 
be a strong, firm, and mutual tie for the more than 50 years since the Korean War. However, 
as the rapid and unrelenting growth of sentiment against the U.S. persists, and the two 
countries’ perceptions of the threat posed by North Korea drift apart, many security experts 
                                                 
 
 
3
 Michael F. Altfeld, “The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,” Western Political Quarterly 37 (December 
1984), pp. 523-44. Also see James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (November 1991), pp. 904-33. 
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have been concerned about the rather strained relationship and conflictual interests that 
suggest the alliance may be in crisis. This gap in perceptions has widened and produced real-
world consequences since the Roh administration took office in 2002 in South Korea, as 
demonstrated by the difference between the Korean policy of engagement and American 
containment.4 Even though the new president-elect, Lee Myongbak, pledged to make a great 
effort to recover the mutual relationship5, many believe that the credibility of the alliance has 
irrevocably declined since the heyday of the relationship. I presume the recent contentious 
issue on the U.S. beef imports6 suggest power shifts caused by South Korean public opinion 
might affect credibility of the relationship between South Korea and the U.S.  
I bring up an interesting issue studying what has been, is, and will the relationship 
between the two countries be like during an economic growth and even more escalated 
democratic consolidation. In order to discover a change of the relationship, I address the 
concept of alliance credibility7 that illuminates mutual ties that have undergone a power shift 
of dyads in alliance (hereafter “a dyadic power shift”). I define that alliance credibility, which 
is an identical term with alliance reliability, is the level of trust that allies feel through 
consideration of various means to measure credibility such as national preference or 
contribution as well as fulfillment of alliance commitments involved with warfare. 
This thesis examines the relationship between a dyadic power shift and alliance 
credibility. 
                                                 
 
 
4
 See Victor D. Cha, “Isolation, not Engagement” The New York Times, December 29, 2002.  
5
 Published by Cho Sanghun, “Newly Elected South Korean Forecasts Chill With North”, New York Times, 
December 21, 2007. 
6
 See Cho Sanghun, “South Korea Continues Beef Talks with U.S.” The New York Times, June 17, 2008 
7
 Alliances can take various forms such as mutual defense pacts, non-aggression or neutrality pacts and entente. 
In many alliances, a nation does not actually have to intervene to fulfill its commitments. For example, 
nonaggression pacts require only that a nation not attack its ally. Although it is inaccurate in a strict sense, I use 
the term alliance credibility or reliability for convenience. 
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1.1 The purpose of study 
Several accounts have pointed to alliance reliability in times of war by examining 
alliance war participation imposed on different types of alliance commitments8 (e.g., Singer 
and Small 1966, 1968; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973; Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and 
King 1980; Smith 1996; Leeds 1999, 2000, 2003). One of the characteristics of extant 
theories on testing alliance reliability is that it depends heavily upon the data embedded 
greatly in the past and based on war participation during 1816-1965. These theories have 
shown attention to various factors including regime type, regime change, class of alliance, 
age of alliance, asymmetry of alliance, or change in capabilities in a monadic way in order to 
examine the relationship with alliance reliability. Especially, James D. Morrow analyzed a set 
of 164 military alliances formed between 1816 and 1965 in order to buttress his arguments 
that alliances causing a greater change in nation’s capabilities are more likely to break down 
and that asymmetric alliances typically last longer than symmetric alliances.9 It is obvious 
that he provided a considerable insight into applying variables relevant to power shift to 
alliance credibility. 
Relatively few studies have been devoted to dealing with power shifts; while most 
previous research regarded variables of regime, class or age of alliance, asymmetry of 
alliance. I assert that the power shift is more likely to reflect variables indicating power 
structure or power mechanism in alliance, constructed by nation’s power or capabilities. Even 
though numerous studies have attempted to find and explore alliance reliability, relatively 
                                                 
 
 
8
 These types of commitment elaborates the class of alliance that has a tendency of indicating that it is 
reasonable defense pacts are regarded as a larger commitment toward war involvement than neutrality 
agreements and passive entente. 
9
 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (November 1991), pp. 904-33. 
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little attention has been paid to the relationship between power shift and alliance credibility 
or reliability. The variable of asymmetry of alliance previously stated might have included a 
relationship between power shift and alliance credibility, yet there has been a clear-cut 
distinction that articulates asymmetry of alliance deals with only capabilities itself. As a 
result, these two variables ought be separated and considered theoretically independent each 
other in terms of the impact on alliance credibility. Although Morrow contributed to our 
understanding of the relationship between the power shift or asymmetry in an alliance and 
that alliance’s credibility, I intend to make a meaningful contribution to complement the area 
of less studied, partly flawed, and untouched power shift relatively distinct from the variable 
of his power shift. Besides, there has been a great change in the international system since 
1965 since national power experienced a rapid change through small power’s growth or great 
power’s decline, which may have caused asymmetry and power shift of alliance. 
Nevertheless, most research has not dealt with post-1965 data without depending on 
fulfillment of alliance commitments to mark a difference in the international system with the 
existing methodology to measure alliance reliability. Specifically, I intend to replace the 
existing dataset relied greatly on war participation data with a new dataset based on the UN 
roll-call data including the concept of the gap of threat perception. 
I seek to apply a new variable to offer a more reasonable and extensive explanation of 
alliance credibility, thus I conduct a detailed examination of alliance credibility incorporating 
an additional concept of a monadic power shift, namely a dyadic power shift. In order to 
elaborate the relationship between the dyadic power shift and the alliance credibility and 
explore an unstudied part of the existing theories by offering a new interpretation of power 
shift, I develop two goals for this research. It is imperative that I address the concept of a 
dyadic power shift before I make the description of these two goals. The dyadic power shift 
in an alliance reflects the comparison of a relative power ratio in a dyadic relationship, 
namely consideration of the dyads in power change simultaneously. On the contrary, a 
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monadic power shift stresses only one country’s power shift based on an absolute power 
index. For example, when on the one hand the U.S power index, that is contingent on how 
this is measured, increases from 10 to 20 in a certain year, on the other hand that of South 
Korea increases from 2 to 4 in the same year, there is no dyadic power shift but each country 
individually experiences a monadic power shift. It is because margin of 10 and 2 explicitly 
demonstrates a monadic power shift while there is no dyadic power shift that equals to 2 for 
both countries. In other words, the monadic power shift underlies that the U.S. and South 
Korea increases 10 and 2 each other in power index; by contrast, the dyadic power shift 
embraces the idea that the two countries increase the same degree of power simultaneously. 
My question starts from the proposition that a dyadic power shift unlike a monadic power 
shift is likely to yield a credible alliance. The two goals are as follows: 
To examine the relationship between a dyadic power shift and alliance credibility, 
thus I am able to find out how relative power shifts affected the ROK-US relationship. 
To apply a new empirical approach using the data from the UN General Assembly 
roll-call votes utilizing the idea of affinity of nations based on the gap of threat 
perception among countries, and this attempts makes a difference with the existing 
dataset that has depended heavily upon a fulfillment of alliance commitments. 
These two goals will suggest an alternative approach to estimate alliance credibility in 
the past and future and, of course, reflect current circumstances. We are able to clarify the 
relationship between a dyadic power shift unlike the existing monadic power shift and 
alliance credibility. 
I believe that my empirical study on this relationship will allow for another potential 
measurement of alliance credibility and provide a broader concept to the existing theories. 
This analysis attempts to bolster the previous research using a different statistical analysis to 
better demonstrate the relationship between power shift and alliance credibility. 
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The motivation for studying the relationship a power shift and alliance credibility is 
to broaden our practical knowledge that enables us to take much account of a dyadic power 
shift. 
1. 2 Statement of the problem 
The widely-recognizable extant theories have mainly studied the relationship between 
power shift in a monadic sense, asymmetry of alliance, regime change, regime type, age of 
alliance and class of alliance commitments, and alliance credibility or reliability (Singer and 
Small 1966, 1968; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973; Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and King 
1980; Morrow 1991; Smith 1996; Gartzke 1998; Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 
1999; Leeds 1999, 2000, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). Moreover, the measurement of 
alliance credibility has depended greatly upon a fulfillment of alliance commitments based 
on war participation. As a matter of fact, except for some scholars such as Morrow and Leeds, 
there has been little empirical research relating power shifts to alliance credibility. Notably, 
when I analyze Morrow’s claim that the probability that an alliance will be broken increases, 
the greater the change occurs in national capabilities over time (Morrow 1991, p. 919), and 
other existing findings including power change with regard to the feature of power appears to 
highlight nation’s individual change based on a monadic power shift by considering only an 
absolute power concept rather than dyads’ relative power change. Although the various 
existing variables with regard to power shift to explain alliance credibility or reliability are of 
great use, the existing theories have been too limited and narrow because the scholars 
overlooked the variable of a dyadic power shift, thus I believe that the dyadic power shift as a 
new independent variable becomes a valuable vehicle to broaden the limited research on 
alliance credibility. I assert that a dyadic power shift would be more reasonable to examine 
the relationship in alliance since the alliance accompanies an interaction by all actors, not a 
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single country. Thus, alliance credibility is likely to be controlled by an interaction causing 
cooperation or conflicts of the relationship. 
Therefore, this thesis begins to seek out the answer for the question how the power 
change variable based on a dyadic power shift facilitates or reduces alliance credibility. The 
primary question to determine the relationship between a dyadic power shift and alliance 
credibility is: 
How did dyadic power shifts affect alliance credibility from 1950 to 2000? 
I address a dyadic power shift in order to concrete the explanatory variable. In order 
for a dyadic power shift to be accepted as a determinant of alliance credibility, it has to meet 
condition of following question: 
Is there any relationship between a dyadic power shift and alliance 
credibility? 
For this question, the hypothesis is: 
H1: The larger dyadic power shifts, indicating both nation’s power ratio, are likely to 
trigger potential conflicts and yield less credible alliances. 
In order to test the hypothesis, I am required to make two crucial assumptions that 
provide a ground for a reasonable proxy replacing alliance credibility and imply another way 
of measuring the alliance credibility in Morrow’s theory. These assumptions are: 
Assumption 1 (for main dependent variable): There is a negative relationship between 
the gap of threat perception10 and alliance credibility. Thus, the larger gap of threat 
perception is likely to weaken and decrease alliance credibility. 
                                                 
 
 
10
 The gap of threat perception defines how much countries have a different idea on a shared and common 
threat. The more gap of this indicates a more conflictual relationship while a less gap of this guarantees a more 
trustworthiness. 
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In sum, the gap of threat perception would be a reasonable proxy to replace the 
concept of alliance credibility by enabling us to measure the same response variable (alliance 
credibility). 
Assumption 2 (for alternative dependent variable to conduct a robustness test): More 
credible alliances are likely to last longer. Thus, older alliances tend to be more 
credible. 
Even though this assumption is not a central idea to study a dyadic power shift theory, 
it is necessary I include the age of alliance for the robustness later on. 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between dyadic power shift and alliance credibility 
as an inverse relationship to illuminate my main hypothesis and theory, the relationship 
between the gap of threat perception and the alliance credibility to buttress my assumption, 
and the relationship between the age of alliance and the alliance credibility to illustrate the 
additional assumption for robustness test. In order to measure the gap of threat perception, I 
utilize a concept of affinity of nations that has been studied by Garztke. Even though there is 
no detailed description of the relationship between the gap of threat perception and the 
affinity of nations, the correlation of the two concepts will be mentioned in a concrete way 
later on, and the affinity of nations will be examined from the U.N General Assembly roll-
call votes. 
Existing research provides some results supporting the first assumption on the gap of 
threat perception. Walt (1985) finds that without a shared perception of common interest, an 
alliance is likely to dismantle. Thus, the gap of threat perception helps explain the ebb and 
flow of alliance credibility. And Bennett (1997) found that when perception of common 
threats to the alliance members is declining or discrepant, the alliance is more likely to break. 
His finding analyzing threats further suggests that the gap of threat perception might be a 
primary cause of the alliance credibility. 
Figure 1. Schematization of Hypothesis, Theory, and Measurement 
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1. 3 Methodology 
Through an empirical approach, I attempt to examine the relationship between a 
dyadic power shift and alliance credibility. Under the assumptions I made in the previous 
section, I attempt to seek out the relationship between a dyadic power shift and a gap of 
threat perception. The gap of threat perception serves as the dependent variable. In order to 
utilize the data pertaining to the gap of threat perception, I referred to Documenting Votes in 
the UN General Assembly V2.0 (1946-2005).11 In order to measure the gap of threat 
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 Gartzke, Erik and Dong-Joon Jo. UN General Assembly Voting V3.0 January 2002. 
http://www.columbia.edu/~eg589/datasets.htm  
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perception, I employ the concept of affinity of nations12 that Gartzke suggested. It illuminates 
how much nations are likely to agree or disagree on various issues regarding foreign policy, 
namely national preference. For example, if two countries agree much on issues, it would 
explain a greater affinity of nations. Nations tend to show a distinct degree of affinity of 
nations on international issues, for instance, such as nuclear testing, sanctions to a specific 
country, and policy in the Lebanese conflict that illustrates an overall security threat. Out of 
these diverse issues, I sought to select issues only relevant to security threats that can be 
applied to circumstances reflecting opinion of all member countries of the UN (e.g., arms 
reduction, disarmament, denuclearization and perception on international security in terms of 
war and conflict) in a bid to obtain the concept of the gap of threat perception. I created a 
new but, compared with Gartzke’s, which included all kinds of international issues, reduced 
dataset. Therefore, my dependent variable is served by affinity of nations on international 
issues to be able to affect the security threats. 
The main independent variable of my theory consists of two major elements, which 
are a dyadic power shift to reflect power change and the existence of an alliance. It is because 
my hypothesis underpins the power shifts in alliance. These two elements comprise the 
independent variable, the dyadic power shift in alliances, which combines these two 
conditions. I measure these concepts with data from the widely-used Correlates of War 
database used by plenty of scholars. First, as the variable of national capabilities calculating a 
                                                 
 
 
12
 Eric Gartzke used the concept of affinity of nations in his article “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, 
Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 1, 
January 1998, pp. 1-27. His concept of affinity of nation represents how much nations agree or disagree on 
international security, economic, social, environmental and cultural issues based on the UN general assembly 
roll-call data. 
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dyadic power shift I sought to utilize National Material Capabilities (v3.02).13 Second, as the 
variable of the existence or nonexistence of alliance I referred to Formal Alliances (v3.03).14 
There are a number of other variables determined from my theory to affect alliance 
credibility as control variables. These 11 variables include international trade; national 
wealth; diplomatic exchanges; colonial history; multilateral alliance; class of alliance; regime 
type; regime change or political stability; shared alliance with the U.S. or U.S.S.R. during the 
Cold War; asymmetry of alliance; and a monadic power shift. For the first group of control 
variables, I referred to the datasets including diplomatic exchanges, class of alliance, and 
shared alliance in Correlates of War. Second, I relied on the datasets including international 
trade and per capita income GDP for national wealth in Penn World Trade. Third, I used the 
datasets involving a colonial history in General International Data by Paul Hensel. Fourth, I 
looked at the datasets including regime type and regime change in Polity IV Project. Lastly, I 
rested on National Material Capabilities dataset to describe asymmetry of alliance and a 
monadic power shift. 
This statistical analysis will provide extensive knowledge to the existing theories and 
approach new questions for a new challenge. Even though plenty of studies on alliance 
credibility have relied upon a quantitative method, the tendency to examine the alliance 
credibility has adhered to a similar direction. I believe the quantitative approach that I 
suggest will lead a new and creative way to give a convincing answer on the alliance 
credibility. 
                                                 
 
 
13
 Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 
1816-1985” International Interactions, 14: 115-32. 
14
 Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Sarkees. Forthcoming. “Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War 
Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000.” Journal of Peace Research. 
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1. 4 Organization of the Study 
This thesis proceeds in the following way. Chapter 2 recapitulates some background 
on major theories regarding an overall feature of alliances, the history of the relationship 
between power change, referring to the dyadic power shift, characterized by a typical 
asymmetric alliance and the alliance credibility of South Korea and the U.S. Chapter 3 
describes a few extant theories including a power change in a monadic sense, namely a 
monadic power shift, on alliance credibility. Chapter 4 elucidates my main theory and lays 
out a research design that depends upon an empirical method by description of various 
variables, data collection, operationalization, and measurement. Chapter 5 analyzes the 
results of testing my hypothesis, discusses the analysis and chapter 6 includes its limitations, 
and implications for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature and Theory 
As repeatedly stressed in the previous two chapters, several analysts in international 
politics have attempted to use a number of variables such as regime type, regime change, a 
power shift in a monadic sense, asymmetry of alliance, age of alliance and class of alliance 
commitment as indicators for alliance credibility (Singer and Small 1966, 1968; Holsti, 
Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973; Sabrosky 1980; Siverson and King 1980; Morrow 1991; Smith 
1996; Gartzke 1998; Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, Smith 1999; Leeds 1999, 2000, 2003; 
Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). Out of the various existing theories, two distinguished scholars, 
Morrow and Leeds, sought to examine the relationship between monadic power shifts and 
alliance credibility. And some researchers limned a correlation between alliance credibility 
and the gap of the threat perception based on a qualitative analysis that supports the 
assumption I made (Walt 1987; Glenn H. Snyder 1997). Morrow (1991) and Leeds (2003) 
attempted to test hypotheses about seeking out the relationship between a variable of power 
change and alliance credibility, which seems closely related to my theory, in a similar context 
but a different approach to clarify the theories. However, we can further build on their 
insights by including a dyadic power shift because both of them have stressed that a power 
change among the allies in a monadic sense, indicating a monadic power shift, is likely to 
decrease alliance credibility, merely based on the probability of alliance commitment 
violation.15 Thus, their central idea is just to observe the effect a change of each individual 
                                                 
 
 
15
 See James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of 
Alliances” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No 4, November 1991, pp. 923-24. See also Brett 
Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties” 
International organization 57, Fall 2003, pp. 815-17. 
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nation’s capabilities on alliance credibility without considering both nations’ power shift 
simultaneously. Therefore, this idea may have limited our understanding of the effects of 
power shifts. Furthermore, most researchers have seemed to depend heavily upon the dataset 
that includes whether or not nations promise their fulfillment of alliance commitments based 
on war participation with respect to the measurement of alliance credibility although the 
measurement has been a correct way. 
In this analysis I attempt to find out whether a dyadic power shift affects credibility 
and to utilize a brand new dataset using affinity of nations in the UN General Assembly roll-
call data to measure gaps of threat perception. The following sections will highlight the 
theories that relate a dyadic power shift in alliances to alliance credibility. In addition, it will 
clarify why I suggest a dyadic power shift in alliances as a main independent variable and 
additionally provide guidelines for how these existing variables should be controlled in later 
sections in order to seek out the relationship between a dyadic power shift and alliance 
credibility. 
2.1 Power changes and alliance credibility 
There have been several attempts to offer a reasonable theory relating power changes 
and the alliance credibility. Morrow and Leeds played a key role in laying out the 
relationship between power change in nations’ capabilities and the age of alliance or the 
alliance credibility (Morrow 1991; Leeds 2003). Even though Morrow has not demonstrated 
the concept of alliance credibility, the age of alliance in his theory may play a key role to 
explain alliance credibility since older alliances are likely to be credible alliances. Variables 
involving power change were an important part of both scholars’ analysis of alliance 
credibility. Furthermore, other scholars attempted to discover whether or not the change of a 
country’s power level would have an impact on its alliance credibility (Siverson and King 
1980; Bennett 1997). Since there are persistent attempts to seek out the causal relations 
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between the age of alliance or alliance duration and the alliance credibility, I am willing to 
follow the previous assumption that the alliance duration is an indicator of alliance credibility. 
This assumption suggests that the older age of alliance would be a natural consequence of a 
credible alliance, thus the age of alliance may be a reasonable proxy for alliance credibility. 
Morrow argues that nations have a propensity to break alliances when they always 
prefer a better trade-off between autonomy and security without maintaining alliances by 
referring to three motivations to attract the shift: (1) a deterioration of its security or 
autonomy in the alliance; (2) an improvement in its security and autonomy out of the 
alliance; or (3) a shift in the nation’s utility function. He stresses that the most reasonable 
factor to generate these three motivations for breaking the alliance lies in changes in power. 
First, his findings support the theory that growth in capabilities of one partner gives rise to 
the increase of its own security, which causes it to demand new concessions or the removal 
of old obligations, thus prompting them to break the alliance, eventually yielding a less 
credible alliance. It is because the enhanced security leads to more autonomy by demanding 
more national interests whereas the weakened security leads to less autonomy by conceding 
more national interests. Second, he analyzes that a decline in capabilities has the same effect 
by reducing security and causing the other partner to demand more autonomy. Thus, he 
hypothesized that larger changes in capabilities increase the likelihood of breaking the 
alliance. In his analysis, the result confirms his argument that greater changes in members’ 
capabilities result in a higher chance to break the alliance, causing a less credible alliance 
(Morrow 1991, p. 919). 
His finding represents that the unit of analysis was individual nations and the 
measurement of the variable of power change was carried out by the individual nations’ 
capabilities. His measurement focused on the shift in each single nation’s capabilities. His 
analysis underlies that a smaller change in nation’s relative capabilities is likely to be an 
older alliance, and the measurement of the capabilities was based on a string of five-year 
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period.16 Even though his analysis took account of the relative capabilities, we can expand 
his research that merely stressed a monadic power shift, by accounting for a dyadic power 
shift. To summarize, he examined the relationship between a power shift and age of alliance, 
and a larger power shift leads to an older alliance, namely a more credible alliance. However, 
he depends completely upon a monadic power shift. 
In addition, Bennett sought to clarify the validity of the autonomy-security trade-off 
model of Morrow (1991) using the same monadic sense of power shifts but relevant utilizing 
a slightly different methodology, a hazard model, applied to 207 alliances from 1816 to 1984. 
In this analysis, he obtained stronger support for Morrow’s finding. Once again, he stresses 
that the larger the relative changes in individual national capabilities, whether these increase 
or decrease, the less credible an alliance is likely to be (Bennett 1997, p. 870). 
Leeds attempted to find whether or not changes in power of a state have an 
association with the violation of treaties in order to explain alliance credibility. She 
underscores that significant changes in the power of a state between the time an alliance is 
signed and the beginning of a war will be associated with a higher probability of alliance 
violation (Leeds 2003, pp. 816-17). Her theory supports that an increase or decrease of state 
power of more than 5 percent between the time of alliance formation and the time of war 
outbreak yields less credible. She emphasizes changes in power, thus she also relies on the 
monadic power shift in alliances by a different measurement of the power shift compared 
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 Morrow examined the coefficients of a regression of age of alliance on each member’s composite capabilities 
on each period. Composite capabilities scores used in the analysis were obtained from the Correlates of War 
project directed by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan. They are based on six different indicators of 
military capabilities: military expenditures, military personnel, total population, urban population, iron and steel 
production, and energy consumption. Thus, a nation’s composite capabilities score is the average of its share of 
these six indicators. His analysis results in that a larger change in power is likely to be an older alliance, thus the 
older alliance represents a more credible alliance. 
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with Morrow. However, I observe that the context to test hypothesis has been similar with the 
existing theories because a strong evidence suggests that changes in power reduce alliance 
credibility. 
2.2 The Theory Based on Dyadic Power Shifts 
A possible limitation is that no scholars have attempted to examine the relationship 
between a dyadic power shift and alliance credibility, not relying on concept of a monadic 
power shift. For example, if South Korea and the United States experience the same increase 
or decrease over a given period, what would the alliance credibility between the two nations 
be like? According to Morrow and Leeds’s theory, the alliance credibility in this relationship 
is less likely to be credible because each nation’s individual changes would entail an unstable 
relationship, regardless of the relative growth, decline, or no change in the dyadic power ratio. 
However, my theory begins with the distinction with their central idea that changes in power 
in a monadic sense would definitely lead to a less alliance credibility. I argue that not every 
monadic power shift causes less alliance credibility by the concept of a dyadic power shift. It 
is because even though there is a monadic power shift, it represents substantially no power 
shifts based on a dyadic power shift. My standpoint holds that if there is no change of the 
dyadic power shift, the alliance credibility does not change. 
I have already noted that several existing theories on power shift and alliance 
credibility have been centered on seeking out the relationship between a monadic power shift 
and alliance credibility. In this section, I attempt to offer one version of a theory concerning a 
dyadic power shift. I start out by pointing out some deficiencies in the previous research 
connecting power shifts and alliance credibility. 
I argue that merely taking a look at a monadic power shift, which focuses on one 
nation’s change in power, on studying alliance credibility fails to capture the essence of 
power shift. By observing this inherent problem, my claim underlies a firm belief that the 
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crucial variable to interpret the relationship between both countries in alliance, especially a 
dyadic relationship is cautiously to observe the change in power including both countries, not 
depending upon simply one country’s change. A monadic power shift disregards the other 
partner’s power shift, thus neglecting simultaneous shifts of both countries. On the one hand 
a monadic power shift reflects an absolute gain or loss of power from one country, but on the 
other hand a dyadic power shift deals with a relative gain or loss of power from both 
countries. My research starts out with the inspiration that the latter could be a broader answer 
to present the essence of power shift that fill the shortcomings of the former. 
Existing theories have dealt with a few factors involving increase or decrease of 
autonomy and security or characteristics of weaker and stronger countries to affect an 
alliance credibility by adhering to only one country’s change in power, which is a monadic 
power shift. In other words, these theories have stressed a causal mechanism regarding a 
change in autonomy and security in accordance with change in power or ambiguous claim to 
emphasize power level. In order to fill this insufficient reasoning, I address a new causal 
mechanism, a renegotiation process, through which the dyadic power shift has an impact on 
an alliance credibility. 
2.2.1 Demand of Contributing Role 
As far as the demand of contributing role is concerned, it defines country’s values 
including attitude and behavior toward another country in alliance. Specifically, when one 
power-gaining country accomplishes a relative increase of power from a domestic or 
diplomatic relationship, the power-gaining country is inclined to demand a more contributing 
role to the other power-losing country that goes through a relative power decline. Thus, the 
demand of contributing role is not a two-way but one-way process because only the power-
gaining country can be an actor that demands the contributing role while the power-losing 
country can be an actor that performs the contributing role. For example, this concept 
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assumes that if the U.S. will provide more military aid to South Korea as a power-gaining 
country, the U.S. would want South Korea to do something corresponding to this contribution. 
Out of these numerous decisions that governments make, the matter of alliance 
formation can be one of the most significant. In addition to the initial government decision 
making, they are likely to make plenty of other decisions to affect the change of an alliance 
after its formation. Thus, governments are forced to make the ceaseless decisions even 
though the issue is restricted to the domain of alliances. Subsequent to alliance formation, 
governments’ decisions about an alliance might shift in the face of various circumstances. As 
I accentuate, dyadic power shifts play a key role to trigger the new government decision in 
the process of alliance formation and management. The results of the decisions reflect that 
governments break down the alliance causing a less alliance credibility, remain in status quo, 
or strengthen the alliance leading to higher alliance credibility. However, I argue that the 
dyadic power shift is more likely to lead to a less credible alliance that could be dismantled 
in any moment. Then, what would precipitate a less credible alliance? When a dyadic power 
shift occurs among countries, they might take account of a contributing role concerning how 
much they fulfill their alliance commitments during an outbreak of war. In other words, if 
one country starts to recognize that it contributes more than the other country does by the 
dyadic power shifts, the former is likely to demand a more contributing role to the latter. It is 
because countries that experience a relative power increase compared with a past dyadic 
power shifts have a propensity to expect the partners’ countries that go through a relative 
power decrease to contribute as much as a relative power increase does. No dyadic power 
shifts would lead to any change of the contributing role since both countries feel the 
contributing role of them is equal. Conversely, dyadic power shifts would lead to change of 
the contributing role since one country feels the contributing role is not equal. Thus, a 
demand of a more contributing role is likely to get involved in a conflictual circumstance 
causing a less credible alliance. Even though a renegotiation process may recover alliance 
  
21 
 
credibility, conflicts would become worse and worse before the renegotiation process. Figure 
2 represents the causal mechanism to connect the independent variable with the dependent 
variable by providing the theoretical ground regarding the demand of contributing role. In 
other words, when the dyadic power shift occurs, one country is likely to demand more 
contributing role owing to inequality of the existing contributing role caused by a relative 
power increase. Thus, the circumstance to trigger demand of more contributing role has a 
great propensity to lead to a more conflictual relationship causing a less credible alliance. 
Figure 2. Causal Mechanism for my Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, it is probable that countries may choose a renegotiation process to deal with this 
problem before the conflictual circumstances; however I assert that the process of demand of 
more contributing role tends to hamper the renegotiation process and promote more conflicts. 
The negotiation process will occur when the potential conflicts might lead to a critical crisis 
in a current administration such as severely deterioration of public opinion or considerable 
infringement of national interests. 
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Cost-benefit analysis reveals the cause of these conflicts in an alliance. Even though 
cost-benefit analysis is mainly used to assess economic phenomena in a society, it might also 
be applicable to alliances. This analytical frame seems to offer a tool to assess the new 
government decision-making in order to enhance as much efficiency as possible. There is no 
question that actors within this model tend to maximize net gains or to minimize net losses in 
different circumstances. One of the new government decision-making with regard to an 
alliance could be centered on evaluating equality or inequality of the contributing role, thus 
an efficiency of the contributing role. The aim of this process is to gauge the efficiency of the 
contributing role compared to past dyadic power shifts. If one country evaluates its partner’s 
contributing role in alliance as less efficient, the former is more likely to demand the latter 
contribute more. Thus, I argue that demanding more contributing role of power-losing 
country in alliance may be able to trigger a conflictual relation; as a consequence the 
conflictual relation tends to lead to a less credible alliance. A conflictual circumstance is 
likely to persist because countries imposed on the more contributing role need a time to carry 
out a new contributing role by renegotiation process. On the other hand, if one country 
evaluates its partner’s same efficiency of the contributing role relative to the past dyadic 
power shifts, the former is unlikely to demand enhanced contributing role of the latter. As a 
result, no demand of contributing role of one party in alliance may be able to fail to increase 
a conflictual relation. Thus the failing of increase of conflictual relation is likely to equal to 
the past alliance credibility. In other words, if one country increases its power relative to the 
other party’s no change in power, the former, seeing its relatively greater contribution, is 
likely to demand more contributing power of the latter. It is because the former is likely to 
discover less efficiency of the latter’s contributing role considering cost-benefit analysis that 
underlies the fact the former no longer feels itself to be obtaining something from the latter or 
it feels like it is losing something to the latter. In the case of one country’s decrease in power, 
the consequence is identical with the previous context. Thus, the latter is likely to demand 
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more contributing role of the former considering the former’s relatively smaller contribution. 
Figure 3 depicts and elaborates the justifiable theoretical ground for my theory based on the 
demand of contributing role. First, countries take a great account of the cost-benefit analysis 
to scrutinize an efficiency of the current government decision-making. Second, once 
countries discover inefficiency of the existing decisions that governments make, they tend to 
make new decisions. Third, as a result of the new decisions, power-gaining countries demand 
power-losing countries contribute more in alliance. It also implies there might be a chance for 
a renegotiation process to get rid of a conflictual circumstance, though the conflicts are likely 
to have a sufficient impact on alliance credibility before the renegotiation process begins. 
Figure 3. Elaborating my Theory 
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contributing role to the latter. If the U.S continues to feel its enhanced contributions toward 
South Korea produce costs more than benefits, both countries are likely to get involved in 
more conflictual circumstances before a renegotiation process to deal with these potential 
conflicts. It is because by its enhanced contributing role, the U.S. could provide more non-
military and military assistance, however no change of the contributing role of the U.K. is 
likely to invoke potential conflicts between the two countries. Second, when the U.K. 
becomes a power-gaining country compared to the U.S by the dyadic power shift, the former 
is likely to demand the latter’s more contributing role equivalent to the former’s enhanced 
contributions. If the U.K. continues to feel its enhanced contributions bring costs more than 
benefits, both countries are likely to be concerned with more conflicts17. It is because by the 
enhanced contributing role, the U.K. may be able to offer more non-military and military 
assistance, but on the other hand no changing role of contribution from the U.S. by the past 
dyadic power shifts is likely to lead to more potential conflicts. Under circumstances that the 
U.S. (the U.K.) goes through a relative decrease in power, the U.K. (the U.S.) experiences a 
relative power increase, thus the latter tends to demand the former’s more contributing role 
causing potential conflicts. Third, when both countries go through the same relative increase 
or decrease in power ratio, that is, when there is no dyadic power shifts, neither of both 
countries is likely to demand more contributing role due to the unchanged mutual 
contributing role. Both countries have a propensity to feel that they are contented with their 
demands based on the unchanged contributing role relative to each other. Therefore, there is 
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 The conflicts here in dyads caused by the demand of more contributing role are distinct from militarized 
interstate disputes. These are any types of conflicts before a renegotiation process begins to cope with the 
conflicts (i.e., breaking off talks, retaliatory actions, or rise of anti-sentiment against both countries). 
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no need to demand more contributing role from each other, and there would be no change of 
alliance credibility compared to past dyadic power shifts. 
In sum, in a relationship that does not require the demand of more contributing role, 
the relationship in alliance is unlikely to be involved in increasing conflicts and to yield the 
same alliance credibility. I assert that the less dyadic power shifts between the two allies 
underpin that the relationship in alliance is unlikely to increase more conflicts and more 
alliance credibility. Therefore, I stress that excluding and disregarding the fact that a dyadic 
power shift is likely to affect an alliance credibility might be a greatest mistake to construct a 
reasonable theory. 
2.2.2 Gap of Threat Perception 
As I introduced as a crucial assumption in the first chapter regarding the alliance credibility 
as the dependent variable, the gap of threat perception can be used as a plausible proxy 
taking a place of the dependent variable. In order to be the convincing proxy as the gap of 
threat perception instead of alliance credibility, I am required to offer compelling theoretical 
evidences. Steven M. Walt, one of the most distinguished scholars of military alliances, 
concludes that a divergent perception of the external common threat between the allies is 
likely to rupture or dismantle existing alliances.18 He stressed the relationship between a gap 
of threat perception and alliance credibility, thus he demonstrates that the less gap of threat 
perception between the two allies is likely to be a more credible alliance. In a recent example 
from the ROK-U.S. relations, the former Roh administration embraced the Sunshine Policy 
while the Bush administration focused on a hard-line policy toward the reclusive North 
Korea. Many analysts shared the common view that the gap of threat perception of Bush and 
                                                 
 
 
18
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Roh administration toward North Korea has widened, as a consequence the divergent 
perception of threat might have led them to undermine the trust of the relationship and the 
alliance.19 The changing threat perception by Walt might have contributed considerably to 
the drifting apart on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons. Thus, the gap of threat 
perception between an engagement policy by the Roh administration and a containment 
policy by the Bush administration toward North Korea is likely to provide a validity to 
correlate between the gap of threat perception and the alliance credibility. Figure 4 exhibits 
the relationship between the dependent variable and a plausible proxy for alliance credibility 
reflecting that alliance credibility and the gap of threat perception might have a significant 
correlation each other. Although there could be a limitation to apply alliance credibility to the 
gap of the threat perception with the same concept, I believe this attempt will validate the 
significant relationship between alliance credibility and the gap of threat perception. The 
two-sided dotted arrow in the figure represents a probable correlation of alliance credibility 
and a gap of threat perception, as stated above. 
Figure 4. Plausible Proxy for Alliance Credibility 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
I have already noted that several existing theories on power shift and alliance 
credibility have been centered on without a doubt seeking out the relationship between a 
monadic power shift and alliance credibility. In this section, I attempt to offer one version of 
a theory concerning a dyadic power shift. I start out with raising some deficiencies in dealing 
with power shift and alliance credibility in previous research. 
I argue that merely taking a look at a monadic power shift, which engages in one 
nation’s change in power, on studying alliance credibility displays a fatal limit to convey the 
essence of power shift. By observing this inherent problem, my claim underlies a firm belief 
that the crucial variable to interpret the relationship between more than two countries in 
alliance, especially a dyadic relationship is cautiously to observe the change in power 
encompassing all relevant countries, not depending upon simply one country’s change. It is 
because a monadic power shift seems to presuppose that it is designed to disregard the other 
partner’s power shift, thus denies all parties’ relevant to the relationship power shift 
simultaneously. On the one hand a monadic power shift reflects an absolute gain or loss of 
power from one country, but on the other hand a dyadic power shift deals with a relative gain 
or loss of power from all relevant parties. Thus, the latter is more likely to offer a more 
persuasive answer to present the essence of power shift that makes up for the weak points of 
the former. I stress that excluding and disregarding the fact that a dyadic power shift is likely 
to affect an alliance credibility might be a greatest mistake to construct a reasonable theory. 
The existing theories have dealt with a few factors involving increase or decrease of 
autonomy and security, and characteristics of weaker and stronger countries to affect an 
alliance credibility by adhering to only one country’s change in power, which is a monadic 
power shift. In other words, these theories have greatly stressed a causal mechanism 
regarding a change in autonomy and security in accordance with change in power or 
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ambiguous claim to emphasize power level. In order to fill this insufficient reasoning, I 
address a new causal mechanism, a renegotiation process, that the dyadic power shift has an 
impact on an alliance’s credibility. 
3.1 Overall methodology 
Based on the significant assumption that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the gap of threat perception and alliance credibility, I seek to examine the 
relationship between a dyadic power shift and a gap of threat perception. In order to show the 
validity of this relationship, I depend heavily upon a quantitative approach using multiple 
regressions since I adopted numerous variables. Referring to various existing datasets which 
have been widely used by a host of scholars in the past for exploration of the relationship 
between power shifts and alliance credibility, I will limit my study to the period from 1950 to 
2000 taking availability of the datasets. My examination will be conducted with a term of 
every fifth year sample for the UN usefulness of dataset since I anticipate there might be 
extremely little change of data for every year; in addition I can expect to reduce cost of time 
and effort compared to every year’s sample. The unit of analysis of my research is a dyad 
year based on every fifth year sample for 50 years. In other words, every observation of 
sample year will be analyzed by dyads. 
3.2 Independent variable 
As I briefly mentioned as an overall characteristic of the independent variable in the 
methodology section in Chapter 1, the independent variable in this analysis is based on a 
dyadic power shift in alliance, not monadic power shift. The independent variable may be 
bipartite consisting of two elements. One is dyadic power shifts to reflect power change and 
the other is power shifts in alliance. These two essential components, namely the dyadic 
power shift in alliances, play a crucial role to construct the independent variable. Both parts 
of this variable come from the COW dataset, which has been well developed and widely used. 
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For a variable related to nations’ capabilities index to determine dyadic power shifts, first I 
sought to utilize NMC (v3.02). Second, for the existence or nonexistence of alliance I 
referred to Formal Alliances (v3.03). The dyadic power shift in an alliance reflects each ally’s 
change in power within dyads measuring the comparison of a power ratio. There are many 
ways of measuring the dyadic power shift in alliance. I attempt to calculate the change of a 
power ratio between dyads characterized by one country and the other country’s power ratio 
or within each country. These two ways converge in one same outcome. The two formulas 
are as follows: 
Dyadic power shift1 in t= (
1
tpower /
1
5−tpower ) / (
2
tpower /
2
5−tpower ) 
Dyadic power shift2 in t = (
2
5−tpower  /
1
5−tpower ) / (
2
tpower /
1
tpower ) 
According to these formulas, the outcome can range from infinitesimally more than 0 
to infinite value. When the dyadic power shift equals 1, there is no dyadic power shift. 
However, when the dyadic power shift is smaller than 1 or is greater than 1, it represents 
some dyadic power shift. For example, when one the on hand the U.S. power index increases 
10 to 20 from 1945 to 1950 as a starting year, on the other hand that of South Korea increases 
from 2 to 4 in the same year, there is no dyadic power shift, but there is a monadic power 
shift in that year. This is It is because in the case of the dyadic power shift, there is no change 
of power ratio, which equals to 2 at each time. However, in the case of the monadic power 
shift, the power index of the U.S. display 10 points increase while South Korea accomplishes 
2 points increase. In this manner, the results describe that both countries increased power 
compared with the past power index. The difference between these two power shifts 
highlights that there is no dyadic power shifts while there is a monadic power shift by 
increasing. In addition, there might be a minor problem regarding the measurement of the 
independent variable. Even though I asserted that the dyadic power shift is likely to cause a 
less alliance credibility, the dyadic power shifts based on the measurement by the power ratio 
led to the two opposite results that one is a less credible alliance, and the other is a more 
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credible alliance. In other words, the dyadic power shifts that are larger than 1 are likely to 
lead to a less credible alliance, conversely the dyadic power shifts that are smaller than 1 are 
likely to yield a more credible alliance because 1 exhibits no dyadic power shifts. In order to 
deal with the problem above, I am required to anticipate an opposite result and interpret in a 
proper way when I select the two different observations, thus data with more than 1 and less 
than 1 of the dyadic power shifts. 
3.3 Dependent variable 
There is much difficulty to find a straightforward statistical dataset that illuminates a 
gap of threat perception among countries in a direct way. It is because Walt never depended 
upon an empirical approach, thus there is no substantial data to directly reflect the gap of 
threat perception such as survey results over time. For this reason, I lay out an indirect but 
plausible dataset, which uses as a proximate concept, the affinity of nations, based on the UN 
General Assembly data collected by Garztke. Out of these various issues, I sought to select 
issues solely related to security threats in order to obtain the precise concept of the gap of 
threat perception. Based on this concept of affinity of nations, when allied-dyads tend to 
disagree more each other on specific issues relevant to security threats, a larger gap of threat 
perception is likely to occur between the allies. Conversely when the allied-dyads are prone 
to agree more on issues, it supports there is a less gap of threat perception. As well as the 
inclusion of the same issues, every year the UN General Assembly involves diverse issues 
distincted from any previous years. Thus, the year I examine includes sufficiently distinct 
issues related to security threat compared with the previous year. 
The dependent variable is the affinity of nation’s score that reflects a different or 
same view on specific issues regarding security threat perception. For data pertaining to the 
affinity of nations, I used Documenting Votes in the UN general assembly V2.0 (1946-2005). 
The formula of the affinity of nations is as follows: 
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Affinity of nations in t = (the number of agreements between dyad memberst / the 
number of specific issues int) + (the number of disagreements between dyad memberst 
/ the number of specific issues int) 
In this formula, the agreement or disagreement represents the voting results when 
dyad members participate in the UN General Assembly votes, and specific issues are 
restricted to the ones only relevant to a variety of security threat such as disarmament, arms 
reduction, or denuclearization. This index ranges from -1 to 1. The case of ‘-1’ represents a 
perfect gap of threat perception, thus complete disagreement on the issues. And the case of 
‘1’ means there is no gap of threat perception, thus perfect agreement on the issues. The case 
of ‘0’ reflects half agreement and half disagreement on the issues. For example, in case of the 
relationship between South Korea and the U.S., I calculate how many times they agree or 
disagree on the specific issues. If they agree 20 times out of 20 issues, the affinity of nations 
will equal 1; if they disagree 40 times out of 40 issues, the affinity of nations will equal -1; 
and if they agree 10 out of 20 issues and disagree 10 out of 20 issues, the affinity of nations 
will equal 0. 
3.3.1 Alternative Dependent Variables for Robustness Tests20 
I anticipate possible problems with the single dependent variable characterized by 
examination of the UN General Assembly roll-call dataset. There might be some extent of 
probable skepticism with respect to a strong relationship between a gap of threat perception 
and alliance credibility. It is because the voting results from the UN General Assembly could 
include a limitation to reflect the gap of threat perception and alliance credibility since the 
gap of threat perception or affinity of nations might be an indirect means to lead to alliance 
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credibility. Furthermore, eroding confidence, I select the specific issues only relevant to 
security threats that exhaustively depended upon my subjective interpretation. Thus I am 
required to present verifiable alternative variables to measure the same dependent variable, 
alliance credibility, for a robustness test in order to figure out the relationship between dyadic 
power shifts and affinity of nations will exhibit a similar pattern with that between dyadic 
power shifts and the alternative dependent variables. I attempt to buttress a validity of the 
relationship between dyadic power shifts and alliance credibility utilizing the two major 
existing measurements of alliance credibility: the age or duration of alliance by Morrow 
(1991), fulfillment and violation of alliance commitments by Leeds (2003). And I use 
alliance endurance in the future on my own theory as another possible variable. I sought to 
utilize the exact same concept as Morrow, however alter the concept of Leeds by applying 
alliance commitments restricted to offensive and defensive alliance with MID dataset by 
reducing her measurement since I assert these two classes of alliance are sufficient to reflect 
alliance credibility by reducing cost of time and effort. I also support the endurance of 
alliance in the future would demonstrate alliance credibility because as long as dyads 
maintain alliance credibility, the alliance is unlikely to break in the near future. 
3.3.1.1 Age of Alliance 
Recent research on the relationship between democracy and commitment has 
attempted to utilize age of alliance as a highly correlated indicator of the strength of 
commitments (Bennett 1997). Although there is no clear-cut explanation for the relationship 
between the age of alliance and regime type (Maoz and Russett 1993), it may be meaningful 
that several authors attempted to utilize age of alliance as a measurement for alliance 
credibility. Morrow (1991) creates a theory on asymmetric and symmetric alliances by the 
autonomy-security trade-off model (see also Altfeld 1984). According to his theory, 
asymmetric alliances tend to last longer than symmetric alliances (Morrow 1991, p. 922) 
asymmetric alliances that have an older age are likely to reflect a more alliance credibility 
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than symmetric ones. Gaubatz (1996, pp. 128-33) also tests whether democracies are able to 
honor commitments by utilizing age of alliance as a convincing measurement for alliance 
credibility. Kaplan (1957, pp. 108-109) points out that “the longer an alliance exists, the 
greater its solidarity.” Thus, he also attempted to test age of alliance in order to measure 
alliance credibility. 
In sum, credible alliances are likely to last longer, and more durable alliances are 
likely to be more credible. 
3.3.1.2 Alliance Commitments through MID 
In an article concerning alliance reliability at war times by Leeds (2003), she 
attempted to measure alliance credibility through taking a close look at implementation or 
violation of any kind of mutual pacts or treaties. She sought to articulate the alliance 
commitments categorized into five types in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions 
(ATOP) dataset.21 Depending upon a relatively higher class of alliance commitments, 
offensive and defensive alliances, in the ATOP data including an aggressive war participation, 
I attempted to measure alliance credibility through these two major alliance commitments 
reflecting whether countries pledged their alliance commitments by performing warfare. For 
example, in an offensive alliance between Canada and the U.S., the alliance between the two 
countries would be credible if Canada attacks China as the U.S. did in the Korean War. In a 
defensive alliance between South Korea and the U.S., the alliance between the two countries 
would be credible if the U.S. attacks countries that attacked South Korea. Regardless of 
offensive or defensive alliance, I assert that the degree of alliance credibility would be 
regarded same once the alliance commitments are honored. However, drawbacks of the 
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measurement utilizing the war participation indicate that offensive alliance commitments 
through MID do not have a sufficient sample size within 10 cases. Thus, the measurement 
will be mainly conducted by the number of defensive alliance commitments. 
3.3.1.3 Alliance Endurance on the Basis of the Near Future 
If alliances endure without breaking down in the near future, these would be likely to 
be credible. A rupture or dismantlement of alliances in the upcoming period is most likely to 
indicate decline of alliance credibility. Even though this variable might seem to have a 
similar context with age of alliance, it would reflect a difference from a perspective that age 
of alliance that does not last for five years in the near future can be measured. In sum, I 
attempt to examine this idea by seeing whether today alliances still will last for five years in 
the future. I assume that alliances enduring for at least five years indicate that the alliances 
have a minimum trust not to break down the relationship. 
3.4 Control variables22 
I control a number of variables likely to affect the relationship between dyadic power 
shifts and alliance credibility. Many of these come from the abundant existing theories 
delving into alliance reliability. A few other variables are derived from my intuition based on 
the conviction that these variables are likely, if missed, to bias in the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable. 
3.4.1 Variables from Existing Theories 
Even though variables from the existing theories may not provide a strong 
justification between these variables and a dyadic power shift or alliance credibility, I believe 
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that these must be controlled because these have been done in studying alliance credibility by 
a number of distinguished scholars. Previous authors suggest eight crucial variables I need to 
control for in order to minimize potential misspecification: regime type I, regime type II, 
regime change, national wealth, shared alliance, asymmetry of alliance, monadic power shift, 
and class of alliance. 
First, one of the most generalized variables to reflect an ideological similarity may be 
a regime by a political reason. Many scholars hold that whether or not allies have the same 
regime, whether democratic or autocratic, could have an impact on alliance credibility. Leeds 
(1999) observes that democratic and autocratic dyads have a greater propensity to cooperate 
causing more alliance credibility than dyads consisting of one democracy and one autocracy. 
Thus, the combination of the same regime type by sharing either democracy or autocracy 
might yield more credible commitments, more cooperative interactions and furthermore a 
more credible alliance than dyads consisting of one democracy and one autocracy. As far as a 
dyadic power shift is concerned, dyads of the same regime type are likely to be engaged in 
more cooperative activities to promote power increase than that of mixed regime. As a 
consequence, more cooperation increasing power may trigger the increased potential for 
dyadic power shifts. 
Second, the theory of “Democratic Peace” (Doyle 1983; Gartzke 2007; Gleditsch 
1992; Kant 1795) argues that democracies are unlikely to fight with one another. On the 
whole, democracies should be expected to consider deliberately in fulfilling their 
commitments, and it is not easy for democratic leaders to act in an opposite way against 
public opinion. There has been plenty of strong empirical evidence to prove this theory 
(Bremer 1992; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995). Gartzke claims 
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that affinity of nations as a willingness as well as institutional factors using UN General 
Assembly roll-call data23 is able to explain the democratic peace, thus Dyads of democracies 
are a salient contributor to promote less wars, disputes, or conflicts than that of autocracies or 
mixed regime with one democracy and one autocracy. Thus these less conflictual 
circumstances are likely to facilitate more credible alliances between democracies than 
autocracies or mixed dyads. As with the previous regime type variable, democratic dyads are 
more likely to trigger the increased potential for dyadic power shifts.  
Third, Leeds (2003) supports that regime change is likely to cause a less alliance 
credibility by testing one of her hypotheses. She argues that when a previously autocratic 
regime democratizes, or a previously democratic regime experiences an autocratic takeover, 
one can anticipate great changes in foreign policy.24 Thus, whenever countries go through a 
critical change in domestic political institutions regardless of toward democracy or autocracy, 
their commitment to alliances fashioned by the previous regime is likely to be called into 
question since they face undercutting of alliance commitments from the previous regime. 
Dyads that went through at least one country’s regime change have a great propensity to 
trigger the decreased potential for dyadic power shifts because the dyads tend to be less 
credible, reducing a possibility for power increase.  
Fourth, Leeds (1999) puts it that wealthy states tend to be better integrated into the 
international system and the wealth promotes more transnational ties. Her analysis highlights 
that wealthy states are more likely to engage in cooperative behavior, and more cooperative 
relations might make a greater contribution to yield a more credible alliance. Regarding the 
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relationship between wealth of states and dyadic power shifts, states are likely to go through 
dyadic power shifts within dyads of wealthy states because these dyads are more likely to be  
engaged in activities to increase power than dyads of poor states or mixed dyads. Fifth, Leeds 
claims that shared alliances could serve as a reasonable proxy for shared positions on the 
East-West conflict during the Cold War. Thus, the effect of the shared super power-alliances 
involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union might be a reasonable way to capture the Cold War 
effect. For example, when South Korea and Taiwan have an alliance with the U.S., they are 
more likely to cooperate each other than with other countries that do not form an alliance 
with the U.S. With respect to the relationship between shared alliances and a dyadic power 
shift, dyads of shared alliance are likely to get involved in more cooperative activities to 
promote increasing power than that of non-shared alliance. Thus, the attempt to increase 
power might lead to the increased potential for dyadic power shifts. In addition, I test this 
variable before the end of the Cold War since unipolarity led by the U.S. is dominant in the 
world. After the Cold War, I will consider the effect of an alliance with the U.S. 
Sixth, Morrow (1991) attempted to define what symmetrical or asymmetrical 
alliances are. He asserts that if both allies are in the same or different category the 
relationships are symmetrical or asymmetrical. Morrow concludes that asymmetric alliances 
are less likely to break in a given period than symmetric alliances and tend to be more 
credible (Morrow 1991, p. 918). He points out that it is easy to yield harmony of interests in 
asymmetric alliances. It is because each country in asymmetric alliances focuses on interests 
of security or autonomy by pursuing a different benefit, however both countries in symmetric 
alliances tend to pursue the same interests that only increase autonomy. Thus, asymmetric 
alliances are more likely to make a good harmony of interests causing a more credible 
alliance while symmetric ones are more likely to get involved in conflict of interests. In light 
of the relationship between symmetry of alliance and a dyadic power shift, symmetric 
alliances are likely to be involved in less cooperative activities by conflict of interests than 
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asymmetric ones. Thus, symmetric alliances with a higher probability to promote power 
increase may lead to the increased potential for dyadic power shifts. 
Seventh, there are two striking major research projects by Morrow and Leeds to 
explain the relationship between a monadic power shift and alliance credibility. Morrow 
(1991) asserts that growth in capabilities in one partner country gives rise to increase of its 
own security, which causes it to demand more new concessions in negotiation regarding 
domestic and foreign policy, eventually facilitate them to break the alliance causing a less 
alliance credibility. In the case of a decline in capabilities, the same effect emerges by the 
declining country’s obtaining less security and the other country’s demanding more 
autonomy. Morrow concludes that a large change in power is likely to increase the 
attractiveness of breaking alliances, causing a less credible alliance. Leeds (2003) argues that 
changes in the relative power of a state may cause changes in its motivation to fulfill alliance 
commitments. Countries that experience decline in power are unlikely to be involved in 
conflicts because they are well aware of a low probability of winning. Countries that go 
through growth in power are unlikely to need an ally’s support, thus they no longer need the 
cooperation of an ally. She observes states that undergo major changes in power, finding that 
they are unlikely to fulfill their alliance commitments. In sum, greater changes of power tend 
to reduce alliance credibility. Although attributes of a monadic power shift are completely 
distinct from those of a dyadic power shift, there still might be commonality in terms of 
sharing the feature of power shift. However, these two concepts are inherently distinct 
because there are no dyadic power shifts despite monadic power shifts. Accordingly, I assert 
there may be a significant multicollinearity between these two variables.  
Eighth, Siverson and King (1980) stress the effect of the class of alliance on alliance 
commitments. Their analysis indicates that defense pacts, where the partners promise to 
assist another through a military deployment, indicate a stronger and greater commitment to 
war participation than rather passive entente or neutrality and nonaggression pacts. Holsti, 
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Hopmann, and Sullivan observe that ideologically similar nations tend to form high-
commitment defense pacts rather than lower-commitment entente or neutrality pacts as coded 
by the COW.25 Their argument assumes that defense pacts bind nations more to their alliance 
commitment than do other categories such as nonaggression or neutrality pacts and ententes. 
Leeds found five different basic commitments such as defensive cooperation, offensive 
cooperation, neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation have different effects on the 
initiation of militarized interstate disputes, emphasizing a mutual defense pact as the highest 
alliance commitment. (Leeds 2003) In terms of the relationship between class of alliance and 
dyadic power shifts, dyads in a higher class of alliance are likely to be engaged in more 
cooperative activities than that in a lower class of alliance because of a more credible 
relationship. As a result, the former with a higher probability to promote power increase may 
lead to the increased potential for dyadic power shifts. A summarized description of the 
control variables based on the existing theories appears in Table 1.
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Table 1. Variables from the Existing Theories 
Variables Rationale Source 
Regime Type I Ideological Similarity → More Cooperation Leeds (1999) 
Regime Type II Democratic Peace Theory 
More Cooperation in Democratic Dyad 
Kant  (1795), Doyle  
(1983), Gleditsch  
(1992),Gartzke  
(2007) 
Regime Change Downplay of Existing Relationship → 
Political Instability  
Leeds (2003) 
National Wealth More Integration and Interdependence Leeds (1999) 
Shared Alliance  Influence of the Cold War  Leeds (1999) 
Asymmetry of 
Alliance  
The Security-Autonomy Trade-off Model → 
Harmony or Conflict of Interests 
Morrow (1991) 
Monadic Power 
Shift 
The Security-Autonomy Trade-off Model → 
Harmony or Conflict of Interests 
Morrow (1991) 
Leeds (2003), 
Class of Alliance  Strength of Alliance Commitments Siverson and King 
(1980) 
3.4.2 Other Control Variables on My Own Theory 
I attempt to articulate a few additional control variables based on my tentative theory, 
which are labeled as diplomatic exchanges, colonial history, international trade, and 
multilateral alliance. 
First, one economic factor, international trade, appears to have an identical context 
with dyads of wealthy states on the ground that the more trade states exchange, the more 
interdependent, interconnected, and cooperative relationship they are likely to have. It also 
may trigger the increased potential for dyadic power shifts. Second, higher levels of 
diplomatic exchange might yield a more credible alliance. I assert that the higher levels of 
diplomatic exchange is likely to engage in more interdependent, interactive, interconnected 
international relations than are non-diplomatic exchanges, thus this behavior may enhance 
cooperative climate to cause a more credible alliance. In light of the relationship between 
diplomatic exchanges and dyadic power shifts, dyads of diplomatic exchanges with a higher 
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probability to trigger power increase may yield the increased potential for dyadic power 
shifts. Third, alliances, generally speaking, consist of two types, bilateral and multilateral. 
These types of alliances are likely to demonstrate a different level of alliance credibility. 
Even though the two competing collective security communities as major multilateral 
alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, might have contributed to build up alliance credibility 
among member countries during the Cold War, multilateral alliances are likely to exhibit 
lower levels of alliance credibility than bilateral alliances. Countries with relatively weak 
power are likely to free-ride in multilateral alliances.26 In a similar context with the free-
riding problem, member countries in multilateral alliance tend to pass the buck to other 
members, clinging to a rather passive attitude. I argue that free-riding only occurs before 
countries have enough faith in alliance credibility to get away with it. As a result, multilateral 
alliances may be less credible than bilateral ones since the former are more likely to get 
involved in the free-riding problem than the latter. Regarding a dyadic power shift, dyads in 
multilateral alliances with a higher probability to trigger power decrease may lead to the 
decreased potential for dyadic power shifts. Fourth, a shared colonial history may yield a 
more credible alliance. For example, the relationship between South Africa and Burma, 
which had both been colonized by the U.K., might display a more credible alliance since a 
shared culture including a same language, institutions, and many intangible elements tends to 
produce ideological solidarity and play a significant role to establish a more cooperative 
environment and as a result a more credible alliance. In a sense of the relationship between a 
shared colonial history and dyadic power shifts, dyads of a shared colonial history are likely 
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to be engaged in more cooperative activities than that of non-shared colonial history. Thus, 
the former with a higher probability to promote power increase is likely to yield the increased 
potential for dyadic power shifts. 
The summarized description of the control variables not based on the existing theories 
appears in Table 2. Although there might not be a strong justification between the control 
variables and the dyadic power shift, I assert that as model misspecifications go, omitted 
variable bias is riskier than including irrelevant variables. I assert that adding predictor 
variables that have a significant effect on both dependent and independent variable here 
include a less possibility to cause model misspecifications than deleting ones. 
 
Table 2. Variables by the Theories on My Own 
Variables Rationale Area 
International Trade Pacifying Effect → More Cooperation Economic Power 
Diplomatic 
Exchanges 
More Interdependence → More Cooperation Foreign Policy 
Multilateral Alliance Free-Riding by Small Powers → Buck-Passing 
→ Undercutting Trust 
Collective Community 
or Organization 
Colonial History Ideological Similarity → More Cooperation Historical Background 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results and Discussion 
The purpose of the data analysis is to examine the relationship between the dyadic 
power shift and alliance credibility. The analysis uses the affinity of nation’s index for the 
main dependent variable and several secondary dependent variables such as the age of the 
alliance, the fulfillment of alliance commitments by combination of MID and ATOP data, and 
the future of the alliance by examining whether alliances last the next five years. The analysis 
also is designed to consider various control variables that might affect both dependent and 
independent variable. Statistical analysis of the relationships stated above requires techniques 
that account for unusual characteristics of the data, which considers dyads based on every 
fifth year from 1950 to 2000. The data encompasses both cross-sectional and time-series 
components, and because many nations have declared independence during the period under 
study, the number of politically related dyads changes over time. I utilize a maximum 
likelihood estimator that identifies the cross-sectional and time-series properties of the data. 
In order to rectify temporal autocorrelation I attempt to measure a common value for rho and 
specify Huber-White standard errors when heteroskedasticity across observations is likely 
(Leeds 1999). In case of future alliance as an additional dependent variable, I use logit or 
probit since these are the most common techniques for analyzing statistical models with 
dichotomous dependent variables. I have reason to expect autocorrelation in the error terms 
both cross-sectionally and intertemporally because the samples consist of repeated 
observations of the same dyads and observations of a number of dyads in the same period. 
Most of the statistical analyses are multivariate regressions using Stata’s xtpcse command 
that depicts the dominant pattern of observations based on every fifth year’s sample. I 
construct a variety of tables to analyze the statistical results. For the most part, my study 
examines the relationship between dyadic power shifts and the affinity of nation, comparing 
a reduced model including only control variables from previous research with a full model 
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including all control variables by adding several control variables based on my own theories. 
In the process of examining the reduced model and the full model, I consider two different 
conditions: one is whether dyads are in alliance, and the other is whether the dyadic power 
shift index is larger than 1 or it is smaller than 1 in order to obtain single result with the two 
anticipating opposite results. For example, if the dyadic power shifts of observations are 
becoming close to 0, these will be applied to observations that are becoming larger than 1. 
Second, I examine the difference between the post-1990 period and the pre-1991 period to 
take account of the different characteristics of the Cold War environment. Thus, I compare 
the results of the data from 1950 to 1990 with that from 1995 to 2000 as well as all sample 
year’s data. In addition, through the statistical results I seek to figure out whether a dominant 
view or public opinion on change of alliance credibility by a host of security experts in South 
Korea is convincing. Third, I carry out the robustness tests to support my main finding, 
which is based on affinity of nations as the dependent variable. I run the regressions using the 
three secondary dependent variables to confirm whether they produce results that are 
consistent with the original result. Next, I compare a model with any types of alliance with 
models respectively including solely defense pacts, including defense pacts and non-
aggression and neutrality agreements, and any types of alliance. Lastly, I consider a model 
transforming some variables to reduce the abnormality of their distributions. 
4.1 The Reduced and Full Model by Partial and All Control Variables 
Table 3 presents the results of estimates of credibility, measured as the affinity of 
nations, using the reduced and full models. While the existing and additional control 
variables on my own do engage in mostly higher index of affinity of nations and get involved 
in occasionally lesser index of affinity of nations, the inclusion of these control variables 
does not have an impact on the primary relationship between dyadic power shifts and alliance 
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credibility. The coefficient of the dyadic power shifts variable is highly significant. However, 
the result is inconsistent with the original hypothesis based on the presumption that 
Table 3. Dyadic Power Shift and Alliance Credibility, 1950-2000 
Unit of Analysis: Dyad-Year 
dyadic power shifts in allied dyads are likely to yield less alliance credibility since affinity of 
nation’s index is likely to increase as the dyadic power shifts do, thus the sign of the 
regression is in the opposite, positive, sign in the wrong direction unlike the hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the dyadic power shifts in all and non-allied dyads (the first, 
Dependent Variable: 
New Affinities 
Reduced Model 
 (The Existing Theories) 
Full Model 
 (Including My Theories) 
Independent Variable All Dyads 
Non-
Alliance  Alliance 
All 
Dyads 
Non-
Alliance  Alliance 
Dyadic Power Shift -.0280*** 
 (.00486) 
-.0301*** 
 (.00504) 
.0302* 
 (.0171) 
.0216 
 (.0166) 
-.0490*** 
 (.00505) 
.0305* 
 (.0169) 
Dyads of Democracies -.0522*** 
 (.00535 
-.0530*** 
 (.00567) 
-.0711*** 
 (.0158) 
-.0624*** 
 (.0148) 
-.0430*** 
 (.00563) 
-.0725*** 
 (.0158) 
Dyads of Same 
Regime 
.0562*** 
 (.00420) 
.0593*** 
 (.00445) 
.0458*** 
 (.0127) 
.0446*** 
 (.0122) 
.0548*** 
 (.00448) 
.0454*** 
 (.0126) 
Regime Change  .0157*** 
 (.00363) 
.0216*** 
 (.00384) 
-.0597*** 
 (.0105) 
-.0597*** 
 (.0103) 
.0176*** 
 (.00378) 
-.0603*** 
 (.0104) 
Dyads of Wealthy 
States 
-.0749*** 
 (.0105) 
-.0810*** 
 (.0115) 
-.0597** 
 (.0246) 
-.0363* 
 (.0233) 
.0112 
 (.0122) 
-.0859** 
 (.0257) 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
-.00367 
 (.00475) 
-.0512*** 
 (.00554) 
.0823*** 
 (.0127) 
.0706*** 
 (.0108) 
-.0210*** 
 (.00570) .0860*** 
 (.0130) 
Symmetry .118*** 
 (.00559) 
.113*** 
 (.00592) 
.141*** 
 (.0154) 
.133*** 
 (.0149) 
.106*** 
 (.00583) 
.130*** 
 (.0153) 
Monadic Power Shift -4.65*** 
 (.360) 
-5.016*** 
 (.398) 
-3.017*** 
 (.881) 
-2.63*** 
 (.777) 
-1.83*** 
 (.349) 
-2.89*** 
 (.940) 
Class of Alliance .111*** 
 (.00446) 
 -.00179 
 (.00897) 
-.00927 
 (.00795) 
 .00384 
 (.00930) 
Dyads of Shared 
Colonizer 
 
  
.0416** 
 (.0144) 
.124*** 
 (.00594) 
.0427** 
 (.0147) 
Dyads of Diplomatic 
Exchange 
 
  
-.0116 
 (.0117) 
-.144*** 
 (.00404) 
-.00781 
 (.0119) 
International Trade  
  
4530*** 
 (1100) 
8690*** 
 (1190) 
4980** 
 (2170) 
Multilateral Alliance  
  
.209*** 
 (.0368) 
 .209*** 
 (.0401) 
Constant .594 .599 .643 .467 .646 .437 
N 41723 38218 3505 3699 37918 3474 
 
Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the.001 level. ** indicates statistical significance at the.01 level. 
* indicates statistical significance at the.05 level. The significance level applies to one-tailed test. 
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second, fourth, and fifth columns) exhibit a negative sign that affinity of nations tends to 
decrease as the dyadic power shifts increase. These results illustrate applying the dyadic 
power shifts to non-allied and all dyads just reflects a larger gap of affinity of nations 
regardless of the hypothesis. In these circumstances, these affinities of nations have no 
relationship with alliance credibility. In addition, through comparison of the allied dyads with 
non-allied and all ones, I discover that the coefficient of the dyadic power shift and several 
variables have the opposite sign in the full model. In other words, the dyadic power shift 
tends to yield less affinity of nations in all and non-allied dyads, conversely it has a 
propensity to promote more affinity of nations, namely a more alliance credibility in allied 
dyads. Both the reduced and full models indicating the same sign of coefficient supports that 
the relationship between the dyadic power shift and affinity of nations is significant 
regardless of the number of control variables. 
 In the reduced model, the coefficients of class of alliance demonstrate an 
insignificant relationship on affinity of nations. In the full model, the variable of the dyads of 
diplomatic exchange was included as insignificant contributor on alliance credibility. 
Noticeably, the coefficients of dyads of democracies, dyads of wealthy states, symmetry of 
alliance, and multilateral alliance indicate an inconsistent result with an opposite sign with 
the existing dominant views and my theories. 
4.2 Comparison between Pre-1991 and Post-1990 Periods 
Table 4 exhibits the comparison between the key periods representing the pre-1991 
and the post-1990 era. This table provides a direct information for comparison between the 
Cold War and post-Cold War feature since the end of the Cold War confrontation was one of 
the biggest events in international relations. As shown in Table 5, the coefficients exhibit 
little difference between the pre-1991 and the post 1990 periods, and the coefficient of the 
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dyadic power shift has the same sign in each period. The results support that the period of 
Table 4. Dyadic Power Shift and Alliance Credibility, 1950-2000 
 Unit of Analysis: Dyad-Year 
 post-1990 is more significant than in the pre-1991 model. In the post-1990 model, the 
coefficient of all dyads has a same sign with allied dyads. Several variables such as class of 
alliance, dyads of same regime, and international trade in the post-1990 reflect insignificant 
coefficients on alliance credibility while the coefficients of dyads of diplomatic exchanges 
and class of alliance are insignificant in the pre-1991 model. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
dyads of shared colonizer and wealthy states in the pre-1991 has changed into an opposite 
sign in the post-1990. Although the post-1990 period measured in 1995 and 2000 starkly 
postdates the collapse of the Soviet Union, the coefficient of the shared great power alliance 
Dependent Variable: 
New Affinities Post-1990 Pre-1991 
Independent Variable All Dyads 
Non-
Alliance  Alliance 
All 
Dyads 
Non-
Alliance  Alliance 
Dyadic Power Shift .129*** 
 (.0321) 
-.0773*** 
 (.00722) 
.138*** 
 (.0328) 
.0151 
 (.0188) 
-.0118* 
 (.00765) 
.0230* 
 (.0191) 
Dyads of Democracies -.0678** 
 (.0312) 
-.00759 
 (.0143) 
-.0863** 
 (.0329) 
-.0875*** 
 (.0193) 
-.0515*** 
 (.00803) 
-.0974*** 
 (.0209) 
Dyads of Same 
Regime 
-.0371* 
 (.0253) 
.0287* 
 (.0137) 
-.0343 
 (.0268) 
.0534*** 
 (.0148) 
.0562*** 
 (.00503) 
.0528*** 
 (.0154) 
Regime Change  -.0490** 
 (.0197) 
.0186*** 
 (.00569) 
-.0524** 
 (.0195) 
-.0583*** 
 (.0124) 
.0157*** 
(.00507) 
-.0588*** 
 (.0126) 
Dyads of Wealthy 
States 
.182*** 
 (.0367) 
.0216 
 (.0196) 
.159*** 
 (.0396) 
.0341 
 (.0297) 
.00864 
 (.0166) 
-.0693* 
 (.0325) 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
.160*** 
 (.0208) 
-.0729*** 
 (.00919) 
.192*** 
 (.0227) 
.0527*** 
 (.0143) 
-.00398 
 (.00697) .0677*** 
 (.0186) 
Symmetry .189*** 
 (.0253) 
.0914*** 
 (.00892) 
.191*** 
 (.0254) 
.0999*** 
 (.0184) 
.118*** 
 (.00772) 
.0915*** 
 (.0189) 
Monadic Power Shift -19.9** 
 (7.17) 
-.0425 
 (.274) 
-19.6*** 
 (6.308) 
-2.14** 
 (.789) 
-4.55*** 
 (.874) 
-2.48** 
 (.980) 
Class of Alliance -.0259* 
 (.0150) 
 -.00117 
 (.00831) 
.00144 
 (.00934) 
 .0157 
 (.0115) 
Dyads of Shared 
Colonizer 
-.0387* 
 (.0224) 
.136*** 
 (.00907) 
-.0424* 
 (.0227) 
.0754*** 
 (.0194) 
.116*** 
 (.00778) 
.0799*** 
 (.0204) 
Dyads of Diplomatic 
Exchange 
.0255 
 (.0201) 
-.135*** 
 (.00621) 
.0314* 
 (.0197) 
-.0245* 
 (.0146) 
-.146*** 
 (.00532) 
-.0210 
 (.0149) 
International Trade 445 
 (1340) 
10280*** 
 (2400) 
-2270 
 (2650) 
5506*** 
 (1550) 
5110*** 
 (1410) 
6460** 
 (3068) 
Multilateral Alliance .0526 
 (.0726)  
.0345* 
 (.0567) 
.217*** 
 (.0461) 
 .206*** 
 (.0522) 
Constant .501 .679 .498 ..473 .601 .456 
N 1109 14585 1059 2590 23333 2415 
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effect in the post-1990 still has a positive sign, which might suggest the U.S as an unilateral 
power is likely to promote a larger affinity of nations, namely alliance credibility. 
4.3 Robustness Tests27 
A variety of regressions described in the previous sections suggest that, contrary to 
the hypothesis, a dyadic power shift in allied dyads is likely to trigger a higher level of 
alliance credibility. I estimated several regressions using three alternative dependent 
variables, extent of alliance, and transformed models for the robustness tests. In the first 
robustness test, I estimated the regressions of the dyadic power shift on alliance credibility 
based on three different measurements: age of alliance, fulfillment of alliance commitments 
utilizing combination of MID and ATOP data, and endurance of alliance in near future. The 
only difference between the main dependent and alternative dependent variables is that the 
former includes observations of all and non-allied dyads unlike the latter that is restricted to 
allied dyads. However, under the same circumstances all dependent variables are restricted to 
the cases in alliance according to my hypothesis. The results, found in Appendix 5, show that 
the coefficient of the dyadic power shift on affinity of nations has the same sign with that on 
the MIDATOP data regarding the fulfillment of alliance commitments, but has the opposite 
sign when credibility is measured by age of alliance or future endurance of alliance. All of 
these relationships are statistically significant. Although several control variables lose, keep 
their significance, or convert the sign of coefficients, it just gives a lot of information that is 
only secondary. The dependent variables utilizing the endurance of future alliance and the 
age of alliance are consistent with my hypothesis by representing a negative sign of 
coefficient in the dyadic power shifts. In addition, the results embrace that the coefficients of 
                                                 
 
 
27
 The results for these regressions are found in Appendix 5, 6, and 7. 
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dyads of same regime, dyads of symmetry, and multilateral alliances in endurance of alliance 
in the future represent insignificant coefficients compared to age of alliance, and several 
coefficients have converted into an opposite sign. I identify that MIDATOP data include 
more insignificant coefficients than affinity of nations. In sum, the results demonstrate that 
each two dependent variable could be consistent and inconsistent with my hypothesis. 
In the second robustness test, I compare different types of alliance including three 
major alliance commitments: defense pacts, non-aggression or neutrality pacts, and entente. 
The results are likely to demonstrate whether each type of alliance would confirm to the 
results found when equally including all types of alliances. The results support the idea that 
the coefficients of alliance 1, alliance 2, and all types of alliance exhibit an identical sign, and 
are significant at the same time. Although there were some minor differences in the control 
variables across the different definitions of ‘alliance,’ the central result was the same. Dyadic 
power shifts consistently had the unexpected effect on alliance credibility. 
In the third robustness test, I transform several of the independent variables to 
enhance the normality of their distributions.28 The results suggest that the coefficient of the 
dyadic power shift in a transformed model as well as an untransformed model depicts the 
identical trend and that nearly all control variables are significant, although there are some 
minor differences in the few control variables. 
4.4. Discussion 
I attempted to analyze three different types of tables regarding my hypothesis, the 
Cold War effect, and the three alternative dependent variables. In this section, I discuss what 
                                                 
 
 
28
 I conducted three transformations converting the dyadic power shift, monadic power shift, and international 
trade into natural log and square root, for example ln (dyadic power shift), ln (monadic power shift), and 
(international trade)0.5 or 0.25.   
  
50 
 
would be a justifiable explanation about the differences of what I anticipated in these three 
analyses. 
4.4.1 My Hypothesis and Application of Control Variables 
In the first analysis regarding the main finding of this project, the coefficient on the 
dyadic power shift variable in allied dyads was clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis by 
exhibiting an opposite sign of coefficient. In addition, the coefficients of dyadic power shifts 
in all and non-allied dyads demonstrate that the dyadic power shifts are likely to yield less 
affinity of nations, thus lead to decline of dyads’ credibility although the results do not 
provide any connection with the hypothesis. While all and non-allied dyads have no 
relationship with my theory and hypothesis, I discover that the hypothesis based on cases in 
allied dyads is inconsistent with my theory. These results reflect that my theory includes a 
limitation to explain the relationship between dyadic power shifts and alliance credibility. 
What would induce this opposite result with the hypothesis in allied dyads? When dyadic 
power shifts occur in allied dyads, power gaining countries are likely to demand more 
contributing role to power losing ones, however the demand of more contributing role might 
be eliminated by a spontaneous cooperation before it leads to potential conflicts. Alliances 
are likely to endure the existing credibility by preventing possible conflicts caused by the 
demand of more contributing role before renegotiation process occurs. Leeds (2003) 
demonstrated that 70% of alliances are reliable. In case of less dyadic power shifts in allied 
dyads, one country is unlikely to claim more contributing role to partner’s country. The 
environment that there is less contributing role between the two countries may trigger 
potential conflicts regarding less improvement of the contributing role because countries in 
allied dyads tend to expect enhanced contributing role than before in order to maintain trust 
each other. The results suggest that the demand of contributing role based on my theory may 
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occur when there are less dyadic power shifts, namely no expectation for contributing role 
performed by partner’s country. 
With respect to significance of the existing control variables and additional control 
variables on my own theory, I discover that some of control variables by the existing theories 
are insignificant, or exhibit opposite sign of coefficients. The result exhibits that the dyads of 
democracies have an opposite sign of coefficient between table 3 and 4 causing a reverse 
consequence. The results supports that the dyads of democracies in allied dyads could lead to 
a less affinity of nations. These unexpected results may be originated from the influence of 
domestic politics by great consideration of public opinion and political chaos caused by a 
variety of actors. The results support that class of alliance and dyads of diplomatic exchange 
do not affect alliance credibility. Through the significance of the opposite sign of the 
coefficients of dyads of wealthy states, symmetry of alliance, and multilateral alliance that 
turns over my initial justifiable explanation with regard to the relationship between the 
control variables and the dependent variable, a reverse theory might be valid. Dyads of 
wealthy states are unlikely to facilitate a higher level of alliance credibility; rather joint 
wealth might trigger a decline of alliance credibility. The more interaction or 
interconnectedness might lead to a more possession of information toward partner’s country, 
and more information may yield a more competitive circumstance in order to attain relatively 
increased interests. Thus, the circumstance would be possible for dyads of wealthy states to 
go into potential conflicts and disputes causing a less credible alliance than in case of non-
wealthy dyads. Concerning symmetry of alliance, the results in Table 3 do not seem to 
support Morrow’s theory. These results suggest that dyads of symmetry yield a higher level 
of alliance credibility while dyads of asymmetry yield more conflictual circumstances, 
leading to less alliance credibility. It is because the stronger power is likely to feel less 
alliance commitment than the weaker power in asymmetric alliances; on the other hand 
countries tend to feel equal alliance commitments in symmetric alliances. Symmetric 
  
52 
 
alliances have a propensity to exhibit a stronger alliance commitment than asymmetric 
alliances. Through the reversed result of multilateral alliance, it supports the idea that 
multilateralism is likely to play a significant role to facilitate alliance credibility. This might 
result from the logic that members of multilateral alliance are likely to mind and deal with 
the free-riding problem. 
4.4.2 The Cold War Environment 
In the second analysis considering different periods, the coefficients of shared great 
power alliance in both pre-1991 and post-1990 are highly significant, and the results in Table 
4 support that the period of the post-1990 is likely to yield a more affinity of nations than that 
of the pre-1991. Even though the Cold War ended in 1991, the effect of the Cold War may be 
still valid in the post-1990 era. The result reflects that dyadic power shifts in both the pre-
1991 and post-1990 have a significant impact on alliance credibility. Although alliances with 
the U.S. might have been less valuable without the Soviet Union threat, the significance of 
the shared great power effect is still dominant. I assert that the remnants of the Cold War 
effect by the two superpowers are still valid and influential in international relations. 
4.4.3 Three Alternative Dependent Variables 
In the third analysis on the robustness tests, for the most part the two dependent 
variables, including affinity of nations and MIDATOP, produce quite different results than do 
the other two dependent variables related to age of alliance and endurance of future alliance. 
The results from the robustness tests suggest the idea that my finding could be inconsistent 
with my theory based on the demand of contributing role since the two alternative variables 
using age of alliance and endurance of future alliance are inconsistent with my hypothesis 
while only one alternative variable is consistent with my hypothesis. I recognize that the 
alternative dependent variables using the concept of MIDATOP and endurance of future 
alliance tend to entail more insignificant coefficients than the other two dependent variables 
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include. The many insignificant coefficients may stem from a partially wrong 
operationalization of MIDATOP data relied heavily upon performance of war participation, 
and from oversimplification of the concept of future alliance since the duration of 5 years 
might not be a reasonable period to measure alliance credibility. The robustness tests support 
that the measurement using affinity of nations may not reflect alliance credibility because the 
two measurements using age of alliance and endurance of future alliance are consistent with 
my hypothesis while the one measurement by MIDATOP is inconsistent with my hypothesis. 
Even though the robustness tests do not provide strong evidence that affinity of nations as a 
plausible proxy for alliance credibility has a similar trend with the others’ measurements I 
adopted, the measurement using affinity of nations for alliance credibility may be a 
significant way through the same sign of coefficient of dyadic power shifts from MIDATOP 
dataset. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research 
The results of the analysis lead to an unanticipated conclusion. The dyadic power 
shifts definitely matter on alliance credibility in a manner that turns over the hypothesis. The 
dyadic power shifts in allied or all and in non-allied dyads are highly significant in overall 
tests, suggesting that a crucial contributor to alliance credibility has not been studied in past 
research. More research is required to clearly explain the different effects of the dyadic 
power shifts in allied or all and non-allied dyads. I discovered that when I include all or non-
allied dyads in the statistical analysis, the dyadic power shifts are likely to yield a less affinity 
of nations. Though, it is unclear that there is a significant relationship between the less 
affinity of nations and alliance credibility because these two types of observations are not 
consistent with my hypothesis. On the other hand, I found when I apply allied dyads to the 
multivariate regression model, the dyadic power shifts tend to trigger a larger affinity of 
nations, namely a more alliance credibility although the results are definitely inconsistent 
with my theory based on the demand of contributing role. I conclude the larger dyadic power 
shifts might lead to a larger affinity of nations, eventually a more alliance credibility only in 
allied dyads. It is because there may exist a difference between a general credibility in a 
general circumstance and alliance credibility in a specific one. In all or non-allied ones, the 
results can not be applied to my hypothesis and theory that the power-gaining countries tend 
to demand more contributing role to the power-losing ones that may lead to potential 
conflicts, causing a less credibility alliance. However, through the opposite result with my 
hypothesis, in allied dyads the potential conflicts might be prevented by a spontaneous 
cooperation when dyadic power shifts occur because the dyadic power shifts may facilitate 
an environment that the demand of contributing role may lead to build more alliance 
credibility. 
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Although I doubt that I have accomplished in seeking out unraveling causes for the 
alliance credibility, I am confident that I provided a single hypothesis in order to show the 
main independent variable, dyadic power shifts, is significant. I hope to instigate a change in 
discovering a potential determinant as dyadic power shifts on alliance credibility and 
indicator as affinity of nations for alliance credibility. Even though it is evident that 
additional analysis of the dyadic power shift or other indicators is required, the findings 
suggested in this research clearly indicate that dyadic power shifts are likely to be related to 
alliance credibility. Several fundamental problems still remain in this study. First, the 
theoretical explanation that the demand of contributing role affects the alliance credibility 
may be incorrect. There might be different theories to explain the inconsistency of my 
hypothesis. Second, two conflicting theories could be found since the robustness tests 
underlie that the one alternative dependent variable represents an opposite sign of 
coefficients compared with the other two alternative dependent variables. It is because there 
is a difficulty that credibility is very hard to measure: different variables ostensibly capturing 
the same concept are producing diametrically opposite results. However, the result that the 
two measurements are consistent, and the one is inconsistent with my hypothesis does not 
support that my measurement using the affinity of nations is wrong. Third, in an empirical 
approach, a few control variables on my own theories that may include a less justification to 
explain the relationship between the control variables and dyadic power shifts or alliance 
credibility might deflect an interpretation of various tests. However, removing possibly 
significant control variables could lead to a riskier conclusion than including less relevant 
ones. 
If the alliance credibility can be accounted for partially by the dyadic power shifts, 
then there may be great possibilities for future research. First, in a perspective of building 
more theoretical explanation to supplement my theory based on the demand of contributing 
role, jealousy appears to be a convincing explanation why the demand of contributing role 
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leads to potential conflicts. Jealousy as well as cost-benefit analysis may play a key role to 
establish the reasons for the effect of the demand of contributing role by dyadic power shifts. 
When the dyadic power shift occurs, one country is likely to feel jealous over the power 
gaining countries. This theory does not allow me for the exclusion that the jealousy might be 
linked to a change of a political behavior in a foreign policy. Second, more attempts to 
account for the difference between the effects of dyadic power shifts in allied dyads or in all 
and non-allied ones are necessary. Especially, my theory includes a limitation to explain the 
relationship between the dyadic power shift in all or non-allied dyads and alliance credibility, 
though other justifiable explanations to figure out what would cause this relationship could 
be possible. I might need to create a hypothesis and theory that encompasses a broader 
concept of credibility including all types of dyads and offer an elaborate theory why alliances 
would cause a difference in explaining alliance credibility. Third, the results on the 
significance of symmetric alliances are inconsistent with the existing theory by Morrow. The 
results could be stemmed from a different definition and operationalization of asymmetry and 
symmetry of alliances. However, the more convincing definition to categorize different types 
of alliances must take a substantial level of asymmetry or symmetry of alliance into account. 
Fourth, in an empirical dimension, finding more convincing alternative dependent variables 
to measure alliance credibility is necessary. Lastly, the South Korean case could be a possible 
application of the analysis of the relationship between dyadic power shifts and alliance 
credibility. The statistical result demonstrates more alliance credibility in allied dyads since 
1990, whereas some security experts’ analysis29 and public opinion in South Korea reflect 
                                                 
 
 
29
 Samsung Lee, A Nuclear Issue and Foreign Policy Toward the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Hangilsa, 
1994); Jongchul Park, The U.S. Conflicts and Accommodation with Both South and North Korea (Seoul: Orm, 
2002). 
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that alliance credibility has become worse since 1990. The empirical results might embrace 
that the alliance credibility between South Korea and the U.S. did not experience a constant 
decline over time since 1990; rather the estimation stresses a constant increase of alliance 
credibility at the same period. The finding describes that the estimation is not consistent with 
a dominant strain of relationship by security experts’ analysis. Other case studies considering 
the results of several control variables such as dyads of democracies and wealthy states, and 
symmetry of alliance as well as dyadic power shifts in this study could be worth to examine 
the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. 
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Appendix 1 Independent Variable 
Variable / Theory Operationalization Measurement Available Dataset 
 
A Dyadic Power Shift 
 
A dyadic power shift 
in alliances plays a 
crucial role to have an 
impact on alliance 
credibility. A dyadic 
power shift is likely to 
trigger potential 
conflicts causing a less 
credible alliance by 
demanding more 
contributing role based 
on power ratio 
compared with a past 
dyadic power shifts. 
Thus, power-gaining 
countries that went 
through a greater 
dyadic power shift by 
increasing tend to 
demand more 
contributing role to 
power-losing 
countries. 
 
In a dyad year, 
a relative power ratio 
using countries 
capabilities index 
between the same 
two countries or one 
country and the other 
country with the two 
different periods will 
show a dyadic power 
shift. For example,  
 
A dyadic power shift 
in1950 = (Power11950/ 
Power11945) / 
(Power21950 
/Power21945) 
the dyadic power 
shift = (Power21945 
/Power11945) / 
(Power21950/ 
Power11950) 
 
*Two dyadic power 
shift conditions (it is 
larger than 1 or 
smaller than 1) would 
indicate the opposite 
sign of coefficient, 
however same result 
may be reflected 
Interval 
National 
Material 
Capabilities 
 (v3.02) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.org 
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Appendix 2 Dependent Variable 
Variable / Theory Operationalization Measurement Available Dataset 
 
Alliance Credibility 
 
Demand of 
contributing role is 
likely to cause a less 
alliance credibility. 
For example, power-
gaining countries that 
attained more relative 
increase tend to 
demand more 
contributing role to the 
power-losing 
countries, as a result 
there might be a 
potential conflicts or 
disputes in the 
relationship. Thus, the 
relationship is likely to 
spawn a less credible 
alliance.   
 
In a dyad year, two 
country’s agreement 
on every issue equals 
to “1” and complete 
disagreement equals 
to “-1” thus, index of 
affinity of nations 
will range from -1 to 
1.  
 
For example, 
Affinity of nations in 
1950 = (the number 
of agreements of 
dyads1950 / the 
number of specific 
issues in1950 + (the 
number of 
disagreements of 
dyads1950 / the 
number of specific 
issues in1950) 
Interval 
The reduced 
affinity of nations 
dataset using the 
UN votes 
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Appendix 3 Alternative Dependent Variables 
Variables / 
Theory 
Operationalization Measurement Available 
Dataset 
Age of Alliance 
 
Many existing theories 
support alliance 
credibility has a close 
relationship with age 
of alliance or duration 
of alliance that how 
long alliance has 
lasted is a strongly 
significant variable to 
reflect alliance 
credibility.  
 
 
 
In a dyad year, 
How long have alliances 
lasted since the formation 
of alliance? Unless the 
alliances break down up 
to now, year of the first 
formation of alliance will 
be the age. But in case of 
collapse of alliances, the 
age will be calculated 
from the starting year of 
the new alliance. 
 
Age of alliance in t = t-a 
starting year of alliance 
For example, if alliance 
started since 1945, the 
age of alliance equals to 5 
in 1950 (If alliances have 
been broken down, a new 
starting year of alliance 
will be applied  
 
 
Interval 
Formal Alliance 
Data 
 (v3.03) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.org  
Alliance Endurance 
 
If alliances endure 
without breaking down 
in the future, these are 
likely to be credible. It 
is because a rupture or 
dismantlement of 
alliances in upcoming 
period could be a 
marked indicator of 
decline of alliance 
credibility.   
In a dyad year, 
whether the alliance 
between the two 
countries will last in 
the next five years. 
Yes:1 (credible) 
, No:0 ( less credible) 
Interval 
Formal Alliance 
Data 
 (v3.03) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.org 
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Variables / 
Theory Operationalization / Measurement 
Available 
Dataset 
Alliance Credibility 
Based on Combination 
of MIDATOP 
 
To examine whether 
countries are likely to 
observe or break their 
alliance commitments at 
wartimes might display 
whether the level of 
alliance credibility is 
high or low. Out of 5 
types of alliance 
commitments based on 
Leeds’ categorization, I 
attempt to select two 
strong alliance 
commitments including 
offensive and defensive 
one. According to class 
of alliance, I attempt to 
identify whether 
countries engage in 
Militarized Interstate 
Disputes under the class 
of alliance. However, the 
offensive alliance 
included plenty of non-
available data compared 
with the defensive 
alliance data. It is likely 
to depend heavily on the 
defensive alliance data 
with a significant 
variation.  
I attempt to apply both 
alliance credibilities to 
the dependent variable. 
Here, to specify the sphere of MID, I 
attempt to define MID as more than 1 
fatality level (1-25 casualties) and 16 high 
activity level (Attack) based on Dyadic 
MID dataset by Zeev Maoz. Since the 
data are engaged in the duration from 
1950 to 2000. There is not much warfare 
recording more than 1,000 casualties. 
Furthermore, if I involve every level of 
MID, the strength of alliance commitment 
might be partially biased because the two 
allies are regarded that they have the same 
obligation of alliance commitment. Thus, 
I describe the threshold as the 
combination of fatality and high collision 
activity to minimize the possible bias. In a 
dyad year, 
 
Alliance credibility in t =  
(Numbers of offensive alliance pledged / 
5)+(Numbers of defensive alliance 
pledged / 5)  
Highest alliance credibility equals to 2 
when countries pledge all alliance 
commitments for five years, and lowest 
value will be 0 when countries break all 
alliance commitments for five years. 
 
Interval variable 
Zeev Maoz (2005). 
Dyadic MID 
dataset (version 
2.0):http:// 
psfaculty. 
Ucdavis.edu/ 
zmaoz / 
dyadmid.html 
and  
ATOP dataset 
www.ruf.rice.edu/~
Leeds/atop.html 
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Appendix 4 Control Variables 
 Variables / Theory Operationalization Measurement Available Dataset 
1 
Colonial History 
 
Colonial history may 
play a crucial role to 
trigger a more credible 
alliance due to the effect 
of ideological solidarity 
such as culture, 
language, institutions 
and so on. The pro or 
anti-colonial history 
based on a dividing view 
on a colonial history 
appears to trigger more 
cooperative activities, 
thus more cooperation 
increasing power may 
trigger the increased 
potential for dyadic 
power shifts.  
In a dyad year, 
 
whether two 
countries have the 
same colonizer, 
Yes: 1, No: 0 
 
It depicts as a dummy 
variable. 
Ordinal 
ICOW 
Colonial 
History 
Data by Paul 
Hensel 
http://garnet. 
acns. 
fsu.edu./ 
~phensel 
/intldata.html 
2 
Diplomatic 
Exchanges 
 
Diplomatic exchanges 
based on a degree of 
interaction of exchanges 
are likely to promote 
alliance credibility due 
to a cooperative climate.  
Diplomatic exchanges 
appear to trigger more 
cooperative activities, 
thus more cooperation 
increasing power may 
trigger the increased 
potential for dyadic 
power shifts. 
In a dyad year, 
which level of 
diplomatic exchanges  
exist, 
 
0:No relations 
.5:unilateral 
diplomacy 
 1: bilateral 
diplomacy 
 
It depicts as a dummy 
variable. 
Ordinal 
Diplomatic 
Exchange 
 (v2006.1) 
http://correlates
ofwar.org 
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3 
International Trade 
 
Trade may a 
significant factor to 
yield a pacifying effect 
to enhance 
international 
cooperation.  
International trade 
appears to trigger 
more cooperative 
activities, thus more 
cooperation increasing 
power may trigger the 
increased potential for 
dyadic power shifts. 
 
Without considering 
GDP, the pacifying 
effect may be biased 
by the size of 
countries. 
In a dyad year, 
  
(Import+Export)1 / 
GDP1 + (Import+ 
Export)
 2 / GDP2  
Interval 
PWT 6.2 
 (Economic 
data) 
http://pwt.econ. 
Upenn,edu/ 
php_site/ 
pwt621 
4 
Multilateral Alliance 
 
Multilateral alliance 
may facilitate less 
alliance credibility 
because member 
countries might 
freeride the collective 
security community 
concentrating on 
passing the buck to 
other members. 
Multilateral alliances 
appear to trigger less 
cooperative activities, 
thus less cooperation 
decreasing power may 
trigger the decreased 
potential for dyadic 
power shifts.   
In a dyad year, 
 
Whether two 
countries form 
multilateral alliance 
with more than 3 
member countries. 
Yes:1 
No: 0  
Ordinal 
Formal 
Alliance Data 
 (v3.03) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.
org 
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5 
Regime Change 
 
Countries that have 
undergone regime 
change in recent period 
are likely to be less 
credible. These countries 
tend to downplay 
existing relationship 
with other countries 
generating less 
credibility.  
Regime change might 
trigger less cooperative 
activities, thus less 
cooperation decreasing 
power may trigger the 
decreased potential for 
dyadic power shifts.  
In addition, this is one of 
the crucial existing 
theories done in the past. 
In a dyad year, 
in the last five years, 
whether the two 
countries experienced 
regime change.  
 
If polity score shows 
more than 3, it 
reflects quick regime 
change in recent 
year. Yes: 1, No: 0 
 
The sum of each 
country’s value. 
Interval 
CIDCM Polity 
Ⅳ 
Project 
Variables 
http//: 
www.cidcm. 
umd.edu/ 
polity/ 
data 
6 
Regime type I  
 
Dyads of same regime 
(both democracy and 
autocracy) are likely to 
be more credible than 
dyads of mixed regimes 
(democracy and 
autocracy and vice 
versa)  
Since ideological 
similarity might trigger 
countries to build trust. 
(Crucial existing theories 
often done in the past). 
In a dyad year, 
in order to judge 
which type of regime 
the two countries 
have, 
 
1: both democracy 
0: both autocracy, 
1: both autocracy 
0: both democracy  
 
Thus, other cases 
automatically 
construct the mixed 
regime (when there is 
neither of democracy 
and autocracy) 
Ordinal Diplomatic 
Exchange 
 (v2006.1) 
http://correlates
ofwar.org 
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7 
Regime type II  
According to the 
Democratic Peace theory, 
democracies are likely to 
be more cooperative and 
credible than other regime. 
For example, democracies 
retain more accountability 
and discretion to fulfill 
their alliance 
commitments; However, 
autocracies depend heavily 
upon one dictator by his 
arbitrary decision involving 
less credibility. Dyads of 
democracies might trigger 
more cooperative activities, 
thus more cooperation 
increasing power may 
trigger the increased 
potential for dyadic power 
shifts (crucial existing 
theories often done in the 
past). 
Interval 
CIDCM Polity 
Ⅳ 
Project 
Variables 
http//: 
www.cidcm. 
umd.edu/ 
polity/ 
data 
8 
National Wealth 
Wealthy states are prone to 
be more integrated into an 
international system and to 
require more transnational 
ties. Thus, wealthy states 
might engage in more 
cooperative activities. 
Another economic index as 
well as an international 
trade may be a significant 
cause to generate a dyadic 
power shift (crucial 
existing theories often done 
in the past). 
In a dyad year, 
per capita income 
percentage of the 
U.S. 
Taking minimum 
percentage out of the 
two countries 
,thus Min (country A 
and country B). 
  
Interval 
PWT 6.2 
 (Economic 
data) 
http://pwt.econ. 
Upenn,edu/ 
php_site/ 
pwt62 
9 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
 
The shared alliance with 
the superpowers like the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union 
is likely to be more 
credible before the end of 
the Cold War (crucial 
existing theories often done 
in the past).  
In a dyad year, 
taking the influence of the 
Cold War into 
consideration, I attempt to 
exclude post Cold War 
era.  
Whether  countries have 
an alliance with the U.S. 
or the Soviet Union, Yes: 
1 No: 0 
Ordinal 
Formal 
Alliance Data 
 (v3.03) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.
org 
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10 
Asymmetry of Alliance  
 
Asymmetric alliances tend to be more 
credible than symmetric ones since the 
former tends to pursue a different interest 
promoting harmony of interests; 
conversely the latter is prone to pursue the 
same interest causing conflict of interest.  
Asymmetry of alliance might trigger more 
cooperative activities, thus more 
cooperation increasing power may trigger 
the decreased potential for dyadic power 
shifts (crucial existing theories often done 
in the past).  
In a dyad year, 
calculating the ratio 
between the two 
countries’ capabilities 
index. 
Country A’s capabilities / 
country B’s capabilities 
 
Max (A,B) / Min (A,B) 
 
National  
Material 
Capabilities 
 (v3.02) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.
org 
 
 
11 
Monadic Power Shift 
 
According the existing theories by Morrow 
and Leeds, a power shift is likely to decline 
alliance credibility. Countries that 
experience considerable increase of power 
tend to claim more their autonomy. Thus, it 
may cause conflict of interests between the 
two countries deteriorating alliance 
credibility. Monadic power shift seems to 
have a direct impact on a dyadic power 
shift.  
In a dyad year, 
Selecting maximum 
value of country A’s 
power shift and country 
B’s power shift, thus  
 
Max (A1955-A1950,  
B1955-B1950) or 
Sum (A1955-A1950) + 
Sum (B1955-B1950)  
 
To do so is to measure an 
absolute change in 
power. 
National  
Material 
Capabilities 
 (v3.02) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.
org 
12 
Class of Alliance  
 
The existing theories stress that class of 
alliance may be a great contributor to 
trigger alliance credibility. Defense pacts, 
non-aggression/neutrality, and entente may 
reflect strength of alliance commitment.  
Class of alliance might trigger more 
cooperative activities, thus more 
cooperation increasing power may trigger 
the decreased potential for dyadic power 
shifts (crucial existing theories often done 
in the past).  
In a dyad year, 
which category of class 
of alliance countries 
belong to. 
 
Defense pacts: 3 
Non-aggression / 
Neutrality: 2 
Entente: 1  
Formal 
Alliance Data 
 (v3.03) 
http:// 
correlatesofwar.
org 
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Appendix 5 Robustness Test Added Dependent Variables 
 
Main dependent 
Variable 
Alternative  
variable 1 
Alternative  
variable 2 
Alternative  
Variable 3 
Independent Variable New affinities  Age of alliance Midatop Future Alliance 
Dyadic Power Shift .0305* 
 (.0169) 
-4.29*** 
 (1.31) 
.0158* 
 (.00951) 
-1.20*** 
 (.279) 
Dyads of Democracies -.0725*** 
 (.0158) 
9.68*** 
 (1.077) 
-.00716 
 (.00791) 
-1.13** 
 (.389) 
Dyads of Same Regime 
.0454*** 
 (.0126) 
-1.37 
 (.861) 
.0113* 
 (.00651) 
.193 
 (.270) 
Regime Change  
-.0603*** 
 (.0104) 
2.57*** 
 (.791) 
.00199 
 (.00517) 
-.752*** 
 (.223) 
Dyads of Wealthy States 
-.0859** 
 (.0257) 
-10.14*** 
 (2.19) 
-.0296* 
 (.0141) 
2.403** 
 (.979) 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
.0860*** 
 (.0130) 
.525 
 (.846) 
-.0184*** 
 (.00566) 
2.67*** 
 (.318) 
Symmetry 
.130*** 
 (.0153) 
1.82* 
 (1.19) 
.0123* 
 (.00923) 
.398 
 (.438) 
Monadic Power Shift -2.89*** 
 (.940) 
-321*** 
 (82.3) 
.261 
 (.372) 
119** 
 (52.9) 
Class of Alliance 
.00384 
 (.00930) 
-5.36*** 
 (.651) 
-.0243*** 
 (.00317)  
Dyads of Shared Colonizer 
.0427** 
 (.0147) 
-5.75*** 
 (1.023) 
-.0154** 
 (.00669) 
.730* 
 (.364) 
Dyads of Diplomatic 
Exchange 
-.00781 
 (.0119) 
6.62*** 
 (.9072) 
.0317*** 
 (.00524) 
.883*** 
 (.258) 
International Trade 4980** 
 (2170) 
828000*** 
 (149000) 
353 
 (965) 
-195000*** 
 (35900) 
Multilateral Alliance 
.209*** 
 (.0401) 
.168 
 (2.708) 
-.0442* 
 (.0275) 
-.728 
 (1.066) 
Constant 
.437 28.7 .0828 3.59 
N 3474 1663 3982 3034 
 
Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the.001 level. ** indicates statistical significance at the.01 level.  
* indicates statistical significance at the.05 level. The significance level is applied to one-tail test. 
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Appendix 6 Robustness Test Alliance Type 
Independent Variable Alliance Alliance 1 Alliance 2 Alliance 3 
Dyadic Power Shift .0305* 
 (.0169) 
.0251* 
 (.0179) 
.0242* 
 (.0177) 
.0305* 
 (.0169) 
Dyads of Democracies -.0725*** 
 (.0158) 
-.0859*** 
 (.0119) 
-.0708*** 
 (.0162) 
-.0725*** 
 (.0158) 
Dyads of Same 
Regime 
.0454*** 
 (.0126) 
.0584*** 
 (.0138) 
.0436*** 
 (.0131) 
.0454*** 
 (.0126) 
Regime Change  
-.0603*** 
 (.0104) 
-.0730*** 
 (.0114) 
-.0653*** 
 (.0107) 
-.0603*** 
 (.0104) 
Dyads of Wealthy 
States 
-.0859** 
 (.0257) 
-.0837*** 
 (.0267) 
-.0887*** 
 (.0268) 
-.0859** 
 (.0257) 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
.0860*** 
 (.0130) 
.112*** 
 (.0148) 
.100*** 
 (.0135) 
.0860*** 
 (.0130) 
Symmetry 
.130*** 
 (.0153) 
.134*** 
 (.0171) 
.134*** 
 (.0162) 
.130*** 
 (.0153) 
Monadic Power Shift -2.89*** 
 (.940) 
-2.013* 
 (.966) 
 -2.29** 
 (.963) 
-2.89*** 
 (.940) 
Class of Alliance 
.00384 
 (.00930) 
 -.0505** 
 (.0182) .00384 
 (.00930) 
Dyads of Shared 
Colonizer 
.0427** 
 (.0147) 
.0770*** 
 (.0200) 
.0669*** 
 (.0161) 
.0427** 
 (.0147) 
Dyads of Diplomatic 
Exchange 
-.00781 
 (.0119) 
-.0109 
 (.0128) 
-.00424 
 (.0123) 
-.00781 
 (.0119) 
International Trade 4980** 
 (2170) 
5067** 
 (2210) 
5025** 
 (2190) 
4980** 
 (2170) 
Multilateral Alliance 
.209*** 
 (.0401) 
.251*** 
 (.0510) 
.197*** 
 (.0459) 
.209*** 
 (.0401) 
Constant 
.437 .390 .501 .437 
N 3474 3044 3267 3474 
 
Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the.001 level. ** indicates statistical significance at the.01 level.  
* indicates statistical significance at the.05 level. The significance level is applied to one-tail test. 
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Appendix 7 Robustness Test Transformation 
 
Independent Variable Untransformed Transformed 
Dyadic Power Shift .0305* 
 (.0169) 
.0952*** 
 (.0274) 
Dyads of Democracies -.0725*** 
 (.0158) 
-.0782*** 
 (.0154) 
Dyads of Same 
Regime 
.0454*** 
 (.0126) 
.0488*** 
 (.0123) 
Regime Change  
-.0603*** 
 (.0104) 
-.0584*** 
 (.0105) 
Dyads of Wealthy 
States 
-.0859** 
 (.0257) 
-.0593** 
 (.0254) 
Shared Great Power 
Alliance  
.0860*** 
 (.0130) 
.867*** 
 (.0122) 
Symmetry 
.130*** 
 (.0153) 
.0877*** 
 (.0158) 
Monadic Power Shift 
-2.89*** 
 (.940) 
-.0268*** 
 (.00382) 
Class of Alliance 
.00384 
 (.00930) 
.00578 
 (.00925) 
Dyads of Shared 
Colonizer 
.0427** 
 (.0147) 
.0312* 
 (.0148) 
Dyads of Diplomatic 
Exchange 
-.00781 
 (.0119) 
.0154 
 (.0126) 
International Trade 4980** 
 (2170) 
39.6*** 
 (7.57) 
Multilateral Alliance 
.209*** 
 (.0401) 
.200*** 
 (.0402) 
Constant 
.437 .229 
N 3474 3474 
 
Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the.001 level. ** indicates statistical significance at the.01 level.   
* indicates statistical significance at the.05 level. The significance level is applied to one-tail test. 
